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Article
Innovation Nationalism
SAPNA KUMAR
Nationalism has experienced a global resurgence, with many world leaders
advocating a return to a glorious, and often illusory, past. In the United States,
economic nationalism has received support from Democrats and Republicans alike,
fueled by growing public backlash to free trade. These changes are having a major
impact on U.S. patent policy. Over the past several decades, the government has
cultivated an identity of the United States as being an innovative country. It has
implemented patent policies that reinforced this identity, such as strengthening
domestic patent rights and requiring trading partners to adopt U.S.-style patent and
intellectual property laws. Many times, these policies have negative consequences,
such as forcing U.S. consumers to subsidize chosen industries through paying
higher prices for goods. This innovation-driven approach to economic nationalism,
however, is changing under the Trump administration. President Trump has chosen
to advance a national identity of nativism and cultural traditionalism, in which
foreign people and foreign ideas are viewed with disdain. With regard to economic
policy, he has embraced a strong sovereign model of governance, implementing
protectionist import tariffs and threatening unilateral trade sanctions against
China. This Article looks to political science and international political economy
research to understand what economic nationalism is and how U.S. patent policy
helps advance it. It looks at the emergence of innovation nationalism under prior
administrations and examines how shifting national identity under the Trump
administration is impacting it.
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Innovation Nationalism
SAPNA KUMAR *
INTRODUCTION
In the past few years, a global wave of nationalism has arrived. World
leaders have sought to elevate the interests of their respective countries
above all others, promising to take control against hostile foreigners who
they claim are responsible for national decline.1 Governments from
countries such as Russia, Turkey, and India have comingled nationalism
with nostalgia, advocating a return to a glorious—and often illusory—past.2
In particular, economic nationalism has experienced a surge in popularity.
Although economists generally agree that free trade is beneficial overall, it
can exacerbate domestic inequality by facilitating job offshoring and
disproportionately hurting workers in certain industries.3
In the United States, support for economic nationalism is steadily
increasing and has been, to some degree, bipartisan.4 Among the Democrats,
*

Law Foundation Professor of Law and Co-Director for the Institute for Intellectual Property and
Information Law, University of Houston Law Center. The author would like to thank Anupam Chander,
Kathleen Claussen, Camilla Hrdy, and Sarah Wasserman Rajec for their helpful comments, as well as
the participants of the Akron Law IP Scholars Forum, the AALS Annual Conference, the University of
Houston Law Center Works-In-Progress Roundtable, the 2018 Works-In-Progress Intellectual Property
Colloquium, and the 2018 ATRIP Congress. She would also like to thank University of Houston Law
Center research librarians Dan Donahue, Christopher Dykes, and Robert Clark for their tireless efforts in
tracking down sources.
1
See League of Nationalists, ECONOMIST, Nov. 19, 2016, at 63 (discussing the roots of
nationalism); Thomas Hale & David Held, Why is the Anti-Global Backlash Happening Now?, WORLD
ECON. F. (Nov. 29, 2017), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/11/anti-globalization-brexitbacklash-nationalism-control/ (discussing how several global leaders have blamed “hostile foreign forces
for national decline, real or perceived” and “have promised to ‘take back control’ to make their country
great again”).
2
See Gideon Rachman, Opinion, Trump, Putin, Xi and the Rise of Nostalgic Nationalism, FIN.
TIMES (Jan. 2, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/198efe76-ce8b-11e6-b8ce-b9c03770f8b1?mhq5j=e1
(discussing how many world leaders have invoked “nostalgic nationalism,” including the United States,
Turkey, Russia, China, Japan, and India).
3
See Michael Hirsh, Why the New Nationalists Are Taking Over, POLITICO (June 27, 2016),
https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/06/nationalism-donald-trump-boris-johnson-brexitforeign-policy-xenophobia-isolationism-213995 (observing that although free trade helped increase
equality between countries, this came “at the cost of creating more inequality within countries” and led
to backlash).
4
See Fitch: Economic Nationalism and Fiscal Reflation Dominate 2017 Global Economic Outlook,
FITCH RATINGS (Nov. 29, 2016, 2:59 AM), https://www.fitchratings.com/site/pr/1015433 (discussing the
long-term growth of economic protectionism); Jack M. Mintz, Steve Bannon May Be Gone, But
Economic Nationalism Is Here to Stay, FIN. POST (Aug. 23, 2017, 7:00 AM),
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President Obama initially supported a “Buy American” provision for
government-funded projects.5 He further called for “economic patriotism”
through the payment of corporate taxes and criticized businesses for
“renouncing their citizenship” to avoid paying them.6 During the 2016
election, Vermont senator Bernie Sanders spoke out sharply against free
trade agreements, which he maintained enriched corporations at the expense
of U.S. workers.7 This trend has now accelerated under President Trump,
who has tapped into a growing backlash against free trade agreements and
has implemented protectionist trade policies to support an “America First”
agenda.8
The U.S. patent system is intertwined with economic nationalism,
beyond simple protectionism.9 For the past several decades, the government
has actively promoted a national identity of innovativeness and tied it to the
U.S. intellectual property (IP) system—particularly to patents.10 Because
patent law is not subject to the high degree of harmonization that exists for
copyrights and trademarks,11 the U.S. government can formulate domestic
http://business.financialpost.com/opinion/steve-bannon-may-be-gone-but-economic-nationalism-ishere-to-stay (discussing the bipartisan U.S. support for economic nationalism).
5
See Carol E. Lee, Obama Backs Off “Buy American”, POLITICO (Feb. 13, 2009, 4:48 AM),
http://www.politico.com/story/2009/02/obama-backs-off-buy-american-018809 (discussing Obama’s
initial support for “Buy American” legislation).
6
Jeff Mason, Obama Rails Against Corporate Maneuver to Evade U.S. Taxes, REUTERS (July 25,
2014,
12:05
AM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-tax-obama-inversionsidUSKBN0FT13K20140725.
7
John Brinkley, Bernie Sanders’ Claim That Free Trade Agreements Cost ‘Millions’ of Jobs Is
Unsupported by Facts, MEDIUM (Feb. 6, 2016), https://medium.com/@johnb505/bernie-sanders-claimthat-free-trade-agreements-cost-millions-of-jobs-is-unsupported-by-facts-6d0b2cc7b648
(quoting
Bernie Sanders as saying that free trade agreements like NAFTA “resulted in the loss of millions of
decent-paying jobs, 60,000 factories in America lost since 2001, millions of decent-paying jobs”).
8
See Tobias Konitzer et al., Who Cares About Free Trade? Not Many Americans, It Turns Out,
WASH. POST: MONKEY CAGE (July 29, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkeycage/wp/2016/07/29/who-cares-about-free-trade/ (finding that of the 33% of Americans who have strong
feelings about free trade, more than 75% are opposed to it). In a 2006 survey by the Pew Research Center,
43% of Republicans and 30% of Democrats said that free trade agreements helped their families. Ten
years later, a survey by Politico and the Harvard School of Public Health showed that 33% of Democrats
viewed free trade as helping their community while only 18% of Republicans did. HARVARD T.H. CHAN
SCH. OF PUB. HEALTH & POLITICO, AMERICANS’ VIEWS ON CURRENT TRADE AND HEALTH POLICIES 2,
4 (Sept. 2016), https://cdn1.sph.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/94/2016/10/POLITICO-HarvardPoll-Sept-2016-Trade-and-Health.pdf.
9
Several scholars have observed how patents can be protectionist. See Colleen V. Chien, Patently
Protectionist? An Empirical Analysis of Patent Cases at the International Trade Commission, 50 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 63, 98 (2008) (maintaining that the international trade commission is not biased against
defendants in litigation under § 337 of the Tariff Act); William Hubbard, Competitive Patent Law, 65
FLA. L. REV. 341, 359–63 (2013) (discussing historical protectionism in U.S. patent law and observing
that TRIPS now limits the ability to implement protectionist patent laws).
10
See infra Part II.
11
See Sapna Kumar, Patent Damages Without Borders, 25 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 73, 109–11
(2017) (discussing how patent law is the least harmonized of all major forms of intellectual property,
leading to comity concerns in enforcing domestic patent laws extraterritorially).
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patent law to protect its strongest industries, such as pharmaceutical drug
manufacturing. Such rights can function as a government subsidy, with the
public artificially supporting chosen industries, thereby disadvantaging
other countries.12 Furthermore, in formulating trade agreements, the United
States frequently requires other countries to adopt strong patent and
intellectual property (IP) rights, in exchange for trade concessions.13 This is
often harmful for developing countries, which lack sufficient infrastructure
to benefit from the increased IP protection. Countries that fail to offer strong
patent rights are punished with various sanctions, even if such laws are not
in their best interest.14
This innovation nationalism approach is now coming into conflict with
Trump’s policies. Trump has promoted a nativist and culturally traditionalist
strain of nationalism, in which foreign people and ideas are viewed as a
threat to traditional values.15 In putting “America First,” Trump has rejected
cooperation with foreign powers. He removed the United States from the
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which would have provided benefits to
U.S. companies seeking foreign patent protection. He furthermore has
eschewed using the World Trade Organization for IP dispute resolution in
favor of using § 301 of the Trade Act and has dramatically increased tariffs
on imported goods. In using such powerful unilateral measures against
countries that infringe U.S. patent rights, Trump risks entering the United
States into a full-blown trade war.
This Article uses economic nationalism theory as a lens for better
understanding U.S. patent policy. Part I looks to research in the fields of
political science and political international economy to examine nationalism
and economic nationalism. It further discusses the rise and fall of U.S. free
trade and the growth of economically nationalistic policies. Part II examines
how innovation and patents became linked, and how all three branches of
government advanced this idea prior to the Trump administration. It
maintains that part of the United States’ national identity has been its status
12

See infra Part III.A.
See Josef Drexl, The Concept of Trade-Relatedness of Intellectual Property Rights in Times of
Post-TRIPS Bilateralism, in TRIPS PLUS 20: FROM TRADE RULES TO MARKET PRINCIPLES 53, 63
(Hans Ullrich et al. eds., 2016) (discussing how trade concessions are used in exchange for higher IP
standards); J. H. Reichman, The TRIPS Component of the GATT’s Uruguay Round: Competitive
Prospects for Intellectual Property Owners in an Integrated World Market, 4 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 171, 255–58 (1993) (predicting that updates to the TRIPS agreement would lead to
countries offering trade concessions in exchange for greater intellectual property protection).
14
See infra Part III.B.
15
See infra Part I.B.2; see also MATT GROSSMANN & DAVID A. HOPKINS, ASYMMETRIC POLITICS:
IDEOLOGICAL REPUBLICANS AND GROUP INTEREST DEMOCRATS 219 (2016) (discussing Trump’s appeal
to cultural traditionalism); Scott Winship, Trumpism: ‘It’s the Culture, Stupid’, NAT’L REV. (Mar. 15,
2016, 6:01 PM), http://www.nationalreview.com/article/432822/donald-trump-culture-not-economyexplains-his-appeal (discussing Trump’s appeal among nativists that are uneasy with rapid cultural
change and perceived decline).
13
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as an innovative country, coupled with the belief that innovation helps the
United States maintain its dominance in the world. Part III then examines
how prior administrations implemented patent-related economic policy in an
attempt to reinforce this innovation identity and explores how the Trump
administration has come into conflict with it.
I. ECONOMIC NATIONALISM IN THE UNITED STATES
Economic nationalism is often viewed as synonymous with protectionist
policies, such as levying tariffs on imported goods or providing subsidies to
national industries.16 But the term encompasses far more, extending to any
economic policy made to advance a shared national identity that exists
independent of race and religion.
A. Overview of Nationalism and Economic Nationalism
1. Introduction to Nationalism
To understand nationalism, one must first understand nations and
national identity. A nation is a collective of people united in a belief of a
territorial right to self-determination.17 Within a nation, national identity
operates at both individual and collective levels.18 For individuals, “national
identity” refers to one’s sense of belonging to a nation.19 The term also refers
to collective beliefs that unite members of a nation, including language,
religion, or ethnicity.20
Definitions for nationalism vary across disciplines. For example,
philosopher and social anthropologist Ernest Gellner described it as a
“principle which holds that the political and national unit should be
congruent.”21 Other scholars view nationalism as an economic policy, a
manufactured linguistic identity, or an ideology of solidarity.22
In political science, a key attribute of nationalism relates to membership
of nations. Once the territorial boundaries for a nation have been

16
See, e.g., Max Fisher, Bannon’s Vision for a ‘Deconstruction of the Administrative State’, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 25, 2017, at A13 (providing the “formal[]” definition of economic nationalism “as
encompassing domestic control of the economy, protectionist policies such as tariffs and opposition to
trade and immigration”).
17
Lowell W. Barrington, “Nation” and “Nationalism”: The Misuse of Key Concepts in Political
Science, 30 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 712, 712–13 (1997).
18
RAWI ABDELAL, NATIONAL PURPOSE IN THE WORLD ECONOMY 1, 24 (Peter J. Katzenstein, ed.
2001) (discussing the two levels of national identity).
19
Id. at 24.
20
Id. at 24–26.
21
ERNEST GELLNER, NATIONS AND NATIONALISM 1 (1983).
22
See Ernst B. Haas, What is Nationalism and Why Should We Study It?, 40 INT’L ORG. 707, 707–
08 (1986) (discussing definitions of nationalism given by economists, political scientists, and
sociologists).
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23

established, nationalism defines the membership and identity of the group
that comprises the nation.24 A collective national identity is utilized for
political, economic, and cultural purposes.25 Importantly, nationalism is the
creation of a shared national identity independent of language, race, religion,
and economic status.26 Gellner described nationalism as transition to a “high
culture” that supersedes the “little culture” of religion and ethnic identity.27
The government plays a key role in shaping national identity,28 such as
by regulating what is taught in the public education system, by using shared
symbols such as flags and national anthems, and by celebrating those
deemed national heroes.29 For example, Singapore uses compulsory military
service to create cohesive identity and the United Kingdom’s monarchy
promotes British values.30 In the United States, the President influences
national identity by making foreign policy decisions that unite the country

23

Barrington, supra note 17, at 714.
See Christophe Jaffrelot, For a Theory of Nationalism, in REVISITING NATIONALISM: THEORIES
AND PROCESSES 11 (Alain Dieckhoff & Christophe Jaffrelot eds., 2005) (describing nationalism as “an
ideology . . . which often claims the control of a nation and/or promotes one’s own identity against
Others” and as being “rooted in identity politics”); Barrington, supra note 17, at 714 (describing how
differing definitions of the term “nationalism” among political scientists generally share a feature of
defining the membership of the group that comprises the nation).
Note that scholars are divided with regard to whether the study of the formation of nations is part
of nationalism. Compare Barrington, supra note 17, at 712 (maintaining that the study of the nation is an
integral part of nationalism) with Jaffrelot, supra note 24 at 11 (arguing that “to construct a theory of the
nation and to evolve one of nationalism are not the same thing”).
25
See ABDELAL, supra note 18, at 25–26 (discussing how national identity shapes the symbol of
the nation, which in turn is used to advance political, economic, and cultural goals).
26
See GELLNER, supra note 21, at 1 (noting that nationalism requires that “ethnic boundaries should
not cut across political ones”); Haas, supra note 22, at 709 (describing nationalism as “the convergence
of territorial and political loyalty irrespective of competing foci of affiliation” such as race, religion, and
profession).
27
GELLNER, supra note 21, at 35–38, 142. This transition occurs, according to Gellner, through
literacy and education. Id.
28
See Alain Dieckhoff, Beyond Conventional Wisdom: Cultural and Political Nationalism
Revisited, in REVISITING NATIONALISM: THEORIES AND PROCESSES 66 (Alain Dieckhoff & Christophe
Jaffrelot eds., 2005) (discussing how “the state is a particularly zealous creator of nationalism,” with its
political, social, and cultural elites working to “reinforce national cohesion”).
29
See GELLNER, supra note 21, at 35–38 (discussing the role of education in propagating a shared
high culture); Dieckhoff, supra note 28, at 66 (discussing how elites use the military, school system, and
literature to reinforce cohesion and “exalt the specificity, originality and glory of the nation”); Frederick
Solt, Diversionary Nationalism: Economic Inequality and the Formation of National Pride, 73 J. POL.
821, 821 (2011) (discussing the tools that governments use to instill nationalism).
30
For example, an authoritarian country like Singapore can use strong government control to shape
national identity. See, e.g., Stephan Ortmann, Singapore: The Politics of Inventing National Identity, 28
J. CURRENT SOUTHEAST ASIAN AFF. 23, 28, 31–32 (2009) (discussing the ways in which Singapore uses
state action to promote national identity).
24
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against an enemy and by choosing which groups to include or exclude in
society.32
Nationalism is a double-edged sword. At its best, it can help create
cohesion and foster social harmony,33 binding complete strangers together
to help those that are less fortunate.34 For example, civic nationalism can be
used to build an identity around shared liberal principles—such as
democracy, social justice, and autonomy—with membership open to any
individual who shares such values.35 This form of nationalism played a
prominent role in the United States in the 1990s, with some scholars
describing it as a push for multiculturalism and others viewing it as a melting
pot.36
At its worst, nationalism creates a feeling of superiority among citizens
over other countries and a disdain for anything foreign.37 As former
Secretary of Labor Robert Reich noted, nationalism can lead to a zero-sum
game in which the public supports policies that only marginally improve the
country’s welfare while harming everyone else and forcing other countries
to retaliate.38 It can furthermore be used to bind the country around a chosen
31
See VANESSA B. BEASLEY, YOU, THE PEOPLE: AMERICAN NATIONAL IDENTITY IN PRESIDENTIAL
RHETORIC 63 (2004) (discussing how U.S. presidents use civil religious themes to shape national
identity); O LE R. HOLSTI, TO SEE OURSELVES AS OTHERS SEE US: HOW PUBLICS ABROAD VIEW THE
UNITED STATES AFTER 9/11 21–22 (2008) (discussing how President George W. Bush labeled countries
as enemies to unite the country); ROSS POOL, NATION AND IDENTITY 15 (1999) (acknowledging that
cultural differences in a country can be overcome by “the existence of a common enemy”).
32
See BEASLEY, supra note 31, at 64–65 (discussing how the presidential rhetoric of shared beliefs
needs opposition for the country to rally against); MARY E. STUCKEY, DEFINING AMERICANS: THE
PRESIDENCY AND NATIONAL IDENTITY 2, 19–20 (2004) (discussing how the president articulates national
identity, including by communicating which groups are included or excluded); Kevin Coe & Rico
Neumann, Finding Foreigners in American National Identity: Presidential Discourse, People, and the
International Community, 5 INT’L J. COMM. 819, 820–21 (2011) (observing that “presidents assign
different groups of Americans to different sociopolitical roles”);.
33
See Haas, supra note 22, at 709 (defining nationalism as “the convergence of territorial and
political loyalty irrespective of competing foci of affiliation” and observing that nationalism “stresses the
individual’s search for identity with strangers in an impersonal world”).
34
See ROBERT B. REICH, THE WORK OF NATIONS: PREPARING OURSELVES FOR 21ST CENTURY
CAPITALISM 304–05 (1992) (observing how nationalism can motivate people to help the less fortunate).
35
See Anna Stilz, Civic Nationalism and Language Policy, 37 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 257, 257 (2009)
(describing how “civic nations” are based on a commitment to uphold political institutions and accept
shared liberal principles underlying them); Kok-Chor Tan, Liberal Nationalism and Cosmopolitan
Justice, 5 ETHICAL THEORY & MORAL PRAC. 431, 432 (2002) (discussing how liberal nationalism
promotes core values of “individual autonomy, social justice and democracy”).
36
See NOAH PICKUS, TRUE FAITH AND ALLEGIANCE: IMMIGRATION AND AMERICAN CIVIC
NATIONALISM 147–50, (Princeton Univ. Press 2005) (discussing how civic nationalism is “based on
neither racial nor religious superiority” and distinguishing liberal and conservative views of it).
37
See Solt, supra note 29, at 824 (discussing how nationalism “is often associated with belief in
national superiority and hostility to outsiders,” but maintaining that nationalism is distinct from
xenophobia); REICH, supra note 34, at 305 (discussing how nationalism “can easily degenerate into
jingoistic contempt for all things foreign”).
38
REICH, supra note 34, at 306.
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enemy and to restrict individual rights. Nationalism can also be used to
divert the public’s attention from more significant problems, such as
economic inequality.40
2. Introduction to Economic Nationalism
“Economic nationalism” is often simplistically defined as economic
policies that discriminate in favor of one’s own country.41 Scholars42 and the
media43 commonly use the term as though it were synonymous with
protectionism, given that protectionist policies are often an important tool
for advancing an economically nationalistic agenda. Pro-free-trade
economists sometimes used the term pejoratively to discount anti-liberal
trends, without exploring why it persists.44

39
Martin Wolf, The Economic Peril of Aggrieved Nationalism, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 17, 2017, 11:11
AM),
https://www.ft.com/content/5c7c6a26-db0a-11e6-9d7c-be108f1c1dce
(discussing
how
nationalistic leaders distinguish “‘real’ people” from “enemies of the people” and use this to justify the
move towards “plebiscitary dictatorship” through the cultivation of paranoia). For example, in Turkey,
Recep Erdogan successfully convinced citizens to grant him more power and abrogated civil rights while
uniting the country against various enemies. See Carlotta Gall, Erdogan’s Victory in Turkey Election
TIMES
(June
24,
2018),
Expands
His
Powers,
N.Y.
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/24/world/europe/turkey-election-erdogan.html
(reporting
that
Turkish voters granted President Erdogan “vastly expanded authority over the legislature and judiciary”
in national elections).
40
See Solt, supra note 29, at 828 (arguing that countries use nationalism to divert the public’s
attention away from economic inequality).
41
See, e.g., C. Christopher Baughn & Attila Yaprak, Economic Nationalism: Conceptual and
Empirical Development, 17 POL. PSYCHOL. 759, 760 (1996) (defining “economic nationalism” as
“discrimination in favor of one’s own nation, carried on as a matter of policy”); Sam Pryke, Economic
Nationalism: Theory, History, and Prospects, 3 G LOBAL POL’Y 281, 285 (2012) (arguing that the term
“economic nationalism” should be limited to “practices designed to create, bolster and protect national
economies in the context of world markets”).
42
See Baughn & Yaprak, supra note 41, at 760 (observing that economists often equate the
economic practices and policies for economic nationalism); Andreas Pickel, Explaining, and Explaining
with, Economic Nationalism, 9 NATIONS AND NATIONALISM 105, 106 (2003) (discussing that economic
nationalism can be understood narrowly to encompass a particular ideology, such as protectionism).
43
See Stuart Anderson, Economists Say ‘Economic Nationalism’ is Economic Nonsense, FORBES
(Feb. 25, 2017, 2:01 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/stuartanderson/2017/02/25/economists-sayeconomic-nationalism-is-economic-nonsense/#1f8abeab306f (referring to economic nationalism as “a
set of political arguments aimed at blaming foreigners for America’s problems”); George Friedman &
Allison Fedirka, America’s Rise of Nationalism Has it Barreling Towards a Crisis, BUS. INSIDER (Jan.
18, 2017, 6:02 AM) http://www.businessinsider.com/the-us-is-headed-to-a-pivotal-socio-economiccrisis-2017-1 (maintaining that “[p]rotectionism—economic nationalism—has gained speed”).
44
See Pickel, supra note 42, at 107–08 (observing that “[n]eo-liberal discourse treats economic
nationalism as a pernicious doctrine, and its proponents as the political enemy” with the term being used
pejoratively); Eric Helleiner, Economic Nationalism as a Challenge to Economic Liberalism? Lessons
from the 19th Century, 46 INT’L STUD. Q. 307, 309 (2002) [hereinafter Helleiner, Economic Nationalism
as a Challenge] (observing that after World War II, liberal economists used the term “to discredit and
attack policies with which they disagreed”); George T. Crane, Economic Nationalism: Bringing the
Nation Back In, 27 J. INT’L STUD. 55, 58 (1998) (discussing how liberal economists view economic
nationalism as a “pathology” that misunderstands the power of the free market).
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However, beginning in the 1990s, this limited view of economic
nationalism was called into question, with scholars seeking to decouple it
from protectionism.45 As political scientists and international political
economists have observed, economic nationalism is far more than a “thin”
view that focuses solely on economic policy.46 Eric Helleiner has argued that
defining nationalism solely through protectionist trade policies neglects the
“nationalist content of economic nationalism.”47 Common or shared values
create a national identity that gives rise to specific economic policies, such
as protectionism.48 Shared negative economic experiences, such as
recessions, can shape national identity as well.49
In this regard, economic nationalism is not synonymous with or limited
to protectionist policies.50 Andreas Pickel has noted that viewing economic
nationalism “exclusively as ideology or policy doctrine” imposes too rigid a
limit on understanding the relationship between national identity and
political economy.51 And as Helleiner has argued, free-trade policies can be
made under the auspices of economic nationalism by being “associated with
national prestige” or linked to projects that are designed to strengthen
national identity.52
45
See Pryke, supra note 41, at 283 (discussing the “major reconsideration of economic nationalism”
that reevaluated the idea that economic nationalism is a protectionist policy); Crane, supra note 44, at 55
(observing that discussions regarding economic nationalism “tend to ignore the variability and
malleability of particular definitions of national identity”).
46
See Pickel, supra note 42, at 114 (criticizing the conventional view of economic nationalism that
is based on the “thin” view of economics which disregards other phenomena, like national identity);
George T. Crane, Imagining the Economic Nation: Globalisation in China, 4 NEW POL. ECON. 215, 215
(1999) (maintaining that economic nationalism should be viewed as a “facet of national identity”).
47
Eric Helleiner, Conclusion: The Meaning and Contemporary Significance of Economic
Nationalism, in ECONOMIC NATIONALISM IN A GLOBALIZING WORLD 220, 221 (Eric Helleiner &
Andreas Pickel eds., 2005) [hereinafter Helleiner, Meaning and Contemporary Significance].
48
Id. at 225 (observing that economic nationalism is associated with core nationalistic values, such
as commitment to sovereignty); RAWI ABDELAL, NATIONAL PURPOSE IN THE WORLD ECONOMY: POSTSOVIET STATES IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 33 (2001) (defining economic nationalism as “a set of
policies that results from a shared national identity, or from the predominance of a specific nationalism
in the politics of a state”); Andreas Pickel, Introduction to ECONOMIC NATIONALISM IN A GLOBALIZING
WORLD 1, 11 (Eric Helleiner & Andreas Pickel eds., 2005) (maintaining that economic nationalism
should be understood as “typical relationships between national identity and economy”).
49
See Crane, Economic Nationalism, supra note 44, at 68–69 (discussing how “memories of
common economic experiences are of some importance in the construction of national identity” and how
“perceived injustices in economic policy” played a role in the American Revolution).
50
See id. at 74 (“Economic nationalism is expressed in many different forms beyond trade
protectionism and industrial policy”); Pickel, supra note 48, at 12 (maintaining that “the concept of
economic nationalism need not be restricted to specific policy doctrines but rather should be viewed more
generically”).
51
Pickel, supra note 48, at 13.
52
Helleiner, Economic Nationalism as a Challenge, supra note 44, at 322–23; see also Stephen
Shulman, Nationalist Sources of International Economic Integration, 44 INT’L STUD. Q. 365, 370 (2000)
(observing that “the development of extensive foreign ties between a minority nation and foreign states
is a form of economic diversification that reduces the nation’s vulnerability to the ruling majority or
minority nation”).
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Treating protectionist policies as mere pathologies misses why
protectionism has such strong staying power.53 Economists widely agree that
free trade is beneficial.54 In an open letter signed by fourteen economists
who led the President’s Council of Economic Advisors under both
Democratic and Republican administrations, the group maintained that
“[i]nternational trade is fundamentally good for the U.S. economy,
beneficial to American families over time, and consonant with our domestic
priorities.”55 Yet, notwithstanding this broad consensus from both sides of
the political aisle, protectionist policies continue to be popular with the U.S.
government and the public.56
Detrimental economic policies may continue to thrive because they
advance a shared national identity.57 Protectionism can go hand-in-hand with
an identity that values strong sovereignty and views foreign people or ideas
as dangerous.58 This can be coupled with advancing “economic patriotism,”
in which people and businesses are exhorted to ignore their own economic
self-interests and buy pricier domestically produced goods.59 Consequently,
even though protectionist policies are ultimately economically destructive,
they persist to the extent that they support national identity.

53

Crane, supra note 44, at 58–59.
See generally JAGDISH BHAGWATI, PROTECTIONISM (1988) (discussing the advantages of free
trade); see infra Part I.B.1; see also N. Gregory Mankiw, Economists Actually Agree on This: The
Wisdom
of
Free
Trade,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Apr.
24,
2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/26/upshot/economists-actually-agree-on-this-point-the-wisdom-offree-trade.html (discussing the broad consensus among economists that free trade is beneficial).
55
An
Open
Letter,
GREG
MANKIW’S
BLOG
(Mar.
5,
2015),
http://gregmankiw.blogspot.com/2015/03/an-open-letter.html.
56
See Jude Sheerin, What Trump Has in Common with Abe Lincoln and Ferris Bueller, BBC NEWS
(Mar. 8, 2018), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-43336529 (discussing the historical
popularity of protectionist policies and how President Donald Trump “raising the economic drawbridge
is thoroughly in keeping with his party’s historical roots”).
57
See Crane, supra note 44, at 74–75 (providing examples from various Asian countries of
economic policies being used to promote national identity).
58
See ABDELAL, supra note 48, at 2 (observing that nationalism-based proposals “lead governments
to interpret their economic dependence on some states as a security threat but on other states as mutually
beneficial exchange”); Hidde Bekhuis et al., Globalization and Support for National Cultural
Protectionism from a Cross-National Perspective, 29 EURO. SOCIO. REV. 1040, 1040 (2012) (proposing
“that globalization processes affect people’s support of cultural protectionism, both by a diversification
view on globalization . . . and by a nationalistic interpretation, that is, a threat to the nation and rising
nationalism”).
59
See Ben Clift & Cornelia Woll, Economic Patriotism: Reinventing Control over Open Markets,
19 J. EURO. PUB. POL’Y 307, 314 (2012) (observing that “economic patriotism” suggests ranking
homeland above individual economic interests). Interestingly, patriotism and nationalism are generally
viewed as distinct. See Daniel Druckman, Nationalism, Patriotism, and Group Loyalty: A Social
Psychological Perspective, 38 MERSHON INT’L STUD. REV. 43, 63–64 (1994) (observing that although
patriotism appears “to lead to strong attachments and loyalty to one’s own group without the
corresponding hostility toward other groups,” nationalism is coupled with disliking other groups).
54
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B. The Historical Development of Economic Nationalism in the United
States
1. Twentieth Century Trade Liberalization
In the early twentieth century, tariffs and protectionist policies were the
norm. The Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 193060 imposed record-high tariffs
on many classes of imported goods, with the average rate on dutiable imports
hitting fifty-three percent—a rise of thirteen percentage points in only three
years.61 Although the primary objective of the tariffs was to help U.S.
industries compete, at least some of them were designed to hurt Europe and
suppress demand for products that were only available from foreign
sources.62 This led to retaliatory tariffs against the United States and caused
global trade to contract.63 As political scientist Elmer Schattschneider
observed, the Tariff Act was largely drafted by a multitude of well-organized
interest groups that sought to advance their own narrow agendas.64 It
crippled international trade and is believed by some scholars to have
deepened the Great Depression.65
A shift in U.S. trade policy began in the aftermath of World War II. U.S.
and British delegates proposed the creation of an economic and financial
plan for post-War reconstruction, including proposals for the creation of the
World Bank and International Monetary Fund.66 In 1947, the United States
and twenty-two other countries signed the Generalized Agreement on Tariffs
60
Smoot-Hawley Act, Pub. L. No. 71-361, 46 Stat. 590 (1930) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C.
§ 1202–1683g (2012)).
61
See Thomas D. Grant, Foreign Takeovers of United States Airlines: Free Trade Process,
Problems, and Progress, 31 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 63, 139–40 (1994) (“The [Hawley-Smoot Tariff] [A]ct
imposed fifty-three percent . . . duties on imports in order to stimulate Depression-era industries and send
a message to protectionist European states.”); Catherine L. Mann, Protection and Retaliation: Changing
the ‘Rules of the Game’, 1 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 311, 312 (“Tariffs were increased
on thousands of products, with the average tariff rate on dutiable imports rising 13 percentage points to
53 percent from 1929 to 1931.”).
62
See BHAGWATI, supra note 54, at 20 (“The Great Depression had been associated with beggarmy-neighbor policies of competitive exchange-rate depreciation and tariff escalation, each aimed at
preserving and deflecting aggregate demand toward one’s own industries at the expense of those of one’s
trading partners.”); Mann, supra note 61, at 326 (discussing the “1,000 percent increase in the tariff on
cashew nuts”).
63
Mann, supra note 61, at 327 (discussing retaliatory measures taken by Spain, Italy, and Canada);
Grant, supra note 61, at 140 (noting that most U.S. trading partners retaliated against the statute).
64
See E.E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, POLITICS, PRESSURES AND THE TARIFF 287–89 (1935) (discussing
how various interest groups sought common ground in shaping tariffs).
65
See BHAGWATI, supra note 54, at 21 (noting that although tariff escalation did not alone cause
the Depression, it is “arguable” that it deepened it); but see ALFRED E. ECKES, JR., OPENING AMERICA’S
MARKET 110, 115 (1995) (arguing that although the business and financial industry viewed the tariff
battle of the 1920s as a “collapse of leadership and discipline in Congress,” which contributed to the
stock market crash, many factors contributed to the Great Depression).
66
Kevin C. Kennedy, The GATT-WTO System at Fifty, 16 WIS . INT’L L.J. 421, 422 (1998)
(discussing the proposed Bretton Woods system).
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67

in Trade (the GATT). The GATT introduced a series of rules to regulate
trade among member nations, including significant cuts in tariffs.68
Although never explicitly mentioned, the clear goal was to promote open
trade.69 Successive rounds of trade negotiation under the GATT provided
further liberalization.70 President Kennedy asked Congress for increased
trade authority,71 which led to the passage of the Trade Expansion Act of
1962.72 This resulted in the Kennedy Round of the GATT,73 in which tariffs
were further reduced and other trade barriers were addressed.74
Beginning in the late 1960s, the United States’ commitment to free trade
showed signs of uncertainty. In 1967, Congress allowed the President’s
power to negotiate tariff reductions to expire,75 and Richard Nixon
implemented protectionist measures in response to the OPEC oil embargo.76
Under the Trade Act of 1974, trade barriers were again dropped.77 But to
secure support from protectionist members of Congress, the Trade Act
transformed the Tariff Commission into the more independent International
Trade Commission (ITC), and it provided the agency with new powers to
protect domestic industries from unfair trade.78
67
CHAD P. BOWN, SELF-ENFORCING TRADE: DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND WTO DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT 11 n.1 (2009).
68
Id. at 11–12 (noting the GATT “created a new basic template of rules and exceptions to regulate
international trade between members . . . and locked in initial tariff reductions that these countries
committed to establish”); G. Richard Shell, Trade Legalism and International Relations Theory: An
Analysis of the World Trade Organization, 44 DUKE L.J. 829, 840 (1995) (noting that the GATT was
originally negotiated “as a provisional trade agreement to lower tariffs”).
69
Kennedy, supra note 66, at 424 (observing that “the guiding economic premise that underlies the
entire GATT-WTO system is open trade”).
70
WTO,
The
GATT
Years:
From
Havana
to
Marrakesh,
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact4_e.htm (last visited Sept. 3, 2018) (“GATT
helped establish a strong and prosperous multilateral trading system that became more and more liberal
through rounds of trade negotiations.”).
71
Bernard Norwood, The Kennedy Round: A Try at Linear Trade Negotiations, 12 J.L. & ECON.
297, 299 (1969) (discussing how President Kennedy requested Congressional authority to negotiate trade
agreements reducing U.S. and foreign duties).
72
Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-794, § 102, 76 Stat. 872. The Statement of Purpose
for the Act included stimulating economic growth and “strengthen[ing] economic relations with foreign
countries through the development of open and nondiscriminatory trading in the free world.” § 102(1)(2), 76 Stat. at 872.
73
Norwood, supra note 71, at 299.
74
Ann V. Morrison, GATT’s Seven Rounds of Trade Talks Span More Than Thirty Years, BUS. AM.
10, July 7, 1986.
75
IAN F. FERGUSSON, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, TRADE PROMOTION AUTHORITY
(TPA) AND THE ROLE OF CONGRESS IN TRADE POLICY 4 (2015)
76
See Sapna Kumar, The Other Patent Agency: Congressional Regulation of the ITC, 61 FLA. L.
REV. 529, 542 (2009) (discussing the resurgence of trade barriers from 1967 to 1974).
77
See Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2112(a) (“The Congress finds that barriers to (and other
distortions of) international trade are reducing the growth of foreign markets for the products of the
United States . . . .”).
78
See Kumar, supra note 76, at 542–544 (discussing Congress’s transformation of the Tariff
Commission into the International Trade Commission (ITC) and discussing how Congress granted the
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In the 1970s and early 1980s, quotas were imposed on steel,
automobiles, and textiles.79 To dodge obligations under the GATT, the
United States relied on “voluntary” agreements, which were negotiated with
various countries to protect the local market for electronics, steel, and other
products.80 Countries agreed to this only to avoid a more severe quota if they
refused.81
Notwithstanding these setbacks, trade liberalization continued.82 After
groundwork was laid by earlier administrations, the United States entered
into the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) under President
Clinton.83 NAFTA was far more comprehensive than the GATT—dealing
with relations among Canada, Mexico, and the United States.84 Although
NAFTA touched on a wide variety of areas, including intellectual property,
its greatest impact was on the automotive industry, agriculture, and textile
manufacturing.85
While NAFTA was being negotiated, the United States was also
involved with the Uruguay Round of the GATT, which was finalized in
April 1994 under the Marrakesh Agreement. This round created the World

ITC the power to make final decisions regarding exclusion orders and the authority to issue cease-anddesist orders).
79
See Robert W. Crandall, The Effects of U.S. Trade Protection for Autos and Steel, 1 BROOKINGS
PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 271, 271 (1987) (noting the protectionist politics in the United States
between 1979-1985 led to quotas on steel, automobiles, and textiles).
80
See WILLIAM R. CLINE, Introduction and Summary, in TRADE POLICY IN THE 1980S 7 (William
R. Cline ed., 1983) (describing marketing agreements with various Asian countries regarding color
televisions and negotiated quotas on steel with the European Commission); REICH, supra note 34, at 71
(discussing the use of voluntary agreements to comply with GATT).
81
REICH, supra note 34, at 71.
82
See BHAGWATI, supra note 54, at 54 (“There was indeed a dramatic conjunction of factors—
drawing on ideology, interests, and institutions—that had clearly driven the engine of trade
liberalization.”). From the end of World War II to the 1980s, the United States’ average tariff rate had
fallen to 4.9%—a 92% reduction—notwithstanding a slowdown in trade expansion. Id. at 3, 54.
83
See William J. Clinton, President of the United States, Remarks on Signing the North American
Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act (Dec. 12, 1993); PETER HANNAFORD & CHARLES D. HOBBS,
REMEMBERING REAGAN 144 (Regnery Publ’g, Inc., 1994) (noting that Reagan’s relationship with
Canadian prime minister Brian Mulroney completed the first step in what became the North American
Free Trade Agreement); Gilbert A. Lewthwaite, Bush Signs North American Trade Pact Clinton Says He
http://articles.baltimoresun.com/1992-12Won’t Renegotiate, BALT. SUN (Dec. 18, 1992),
18/news/1992353055_1_treaty-renegotiate-clinton (discussing Bush signing NAFTA).
84
Michael W. Gordon, Some Comments and Comparisons: GATT and NAFTA, 1 U.S.-MEX. L.J.
25, 26 (1993) (discussing how NAFTA dealt with economic, social, and political relations among the
three countries).
85
See Mary E. Burfisher et al., The Impact of NAFTA on the United States, 15 J. ECON. PERSP. 125,
34–39 (2001) (discussing the impact of NAFTA on agriculture, automobile, and textile industry);
Brendan Greeley et al., Trump Threatens to Undo NAFTA’s Auto Alley, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK
(Jan. 26, 2017, 2:39 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-01-26/trump-threatens-toundo-nafta-s-auto-alley (discussing how under NAFTA, the North American automotive industry has
become interdependent).
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Trade Organization (WTO) and provided new powers for compelling other
countries to enforce IP rights,86 discussed in further detail in Part III.
2. Shifting National Identity and the Rise of U.S. Economic
Nationalism
Public support in the U.S. for free trade began to erode after the passage
of NAFTA. Research supports that domestic economic factors and
technological change played a much greater role in job loss than trade
liberalization.87 Nevertheless, free trade agreements and liberal immigration
policies were blamed for the loss of low-skill manufacturing jobs, with
online media falsely proclaiming that NAFTA led to the loss of as many as
one million jobs.88 Some U.S. states were disproportionately harmed, as
were previously protected industries, such as sugar and textiles.89 The
benefits received by others from free trade were not used to mitigate these
losses.90
Although NAFTA laid the groundwork for a resurgence of
protectionism, the economic events of the late 2000s also played a
substantial role. The 2008 Financial Crisis or “Great Recession” was the
worst financial downturn since World War II and spread rapidly throughout

86

See Dan Hunter, Culture War, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1105, 1116 (2005) (discussing the creation of the

WTO).
87
Alan V. Deardorff & Dalia S. Hakura, Trade and Wages—What Are the Questions?, in TRADE
WAGES: LEVELING WAGES DOWN? 104 (Jagdish Bhagwati & Marvin H. Kosters, eds., 1994)
(observing that empirical studies have not been conclusive regarding protection affecting wages, and
maintaining that U.S. macroeconomic policy more likely disrupted labor markets); Robert Z. Lawrence
& Matthew J. Slaughter, International Trade and American Wages in the 1980s: Giant Sucking Sound
or Small Hiccup?, 2 BROOKINGS PAPERS MACROECONOMICS 161, 163, 193 (1993) (noting that empirical
data does not support theory-based arguments for free trade negatively impacting wages, and maintaining
that technological change has played a greater role in reducing wages for production workers).
88
See Lori Wallach, NAFTA at 20: One Million U.S. Jobs Lost, Higher Income Inequality,
HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 6, 2014, 3:19 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/lori-wallach/nafta-at-20one-million-u_b_4550207.html (stating that NAFTA’s outcome is a “staggering $181 billion U.S. trade
deficit . . . and the related loss of 1 million net U.S. jobs”); Robert E. Scott, The High Price of ‘Free’
Trade 1–3 (Econ. Pol’y Inst. Briefing Paper, Nov. 2003), https://www.epi.org/files/page//old/briefingpapers/147/epi_bp147.pdf (concluding that NAFTA “has caused the displacement of
production that supported 879,280 U.S. jobs”). Twenty years of data, however, shows that NAFTA
helped increase U.S. wages and had little impact on aggregate job loss. Justino De La Cruz & David
Riker, The Impact of NAFTA on U.S. Labor Markets 10–11 2014) (observing that economic literature
suggests a 0.17 to 0.2 percent increase in U.S. real wages and discussing how there was no net
employment changes in the U.S. economy from NAFTA).
89
See De La Cruz & Riker, supra note 88, at 11 (discussing how the sugar and apparel industries
were negatively impacted by NAFTA); John McLaren & Shushanik Hakobyan, Looking for Local Labor
Market Effects of NAFTA 20, 22–23 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16535, 2010),
http://www.nber.org/papers/w16535.pdf (noting that although NAFTA had little impact on employment,
it harmed protected industries such as footwear, textiles, and plastics and disproportionately harmed
certain states).
90
De La Cruz & Riker, supra note 88, at 11.
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91

the world. Many major economies fell into recession and others
experienced an abrupt slowdown.92 Although economists are divided as to
whether protectionism rose globally in the aftermath,93 when one factors in
the use of antidumping duties, protectionism did rise in the United States.94
The financial crisis furthermore led to the failure of the delayed Doha Round
of the WTO trade negotiations.95
Meanwhile, a shift was beginning in U.S. national identity. In 2004,
political scientist and anti-multiculturalist Samuel Huntington noted that a
“very plausible reaction” to multiculturalism would be an “exclusivist”
movement, primarily comprised of working-class and middle-class white
males, seeking to “stop or reverse” changes that they believe had diminished
their social and economic status, caused their job loss, and displaced their
culture and identity.96 While this belief was originally not widespread, the
9/11 attacks allowed it to take root, creating anti-immigrant sentiment and a
push towards a “white, Christian, native-born” country.97
This emerging identity can be described as a mix of cultural
traditionalism and nativism.98 A culturally traditionalist identity is generally
one that emphasizes a local perspective and religious values.99 Nativist
91
INT’L MONETARY FUND, WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK APRIL
2009 (2009),
https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/Issues/2016/12/31/Crisis-and-Recovery.
92
Id.
93
Compare Hiau Looi Kee et al., Protectionism on the Rise? Assessing National Trade Policies
During the Crisis of 2008, 95 REV. ECON. & STAT. 342, 345 (2013) (concluding that protectionism based
on tariffs and antidumping duties rose in only a small number of countries), with Matthieu Bussière et
al., Protectionist Responses to the Crisis: Global Trends and Implications, 34 WORLD ECON. 826, 850
(2011) (concluding that protectionist measures to restrict trade through tariff and non-tariff trade barriers
rose during the 2008 crisis).
94
See Kee, supra note 93, at 345 (discussing the rise in U.S. protectionism).
95
See Bussière et al., supra note 93, at 835 (discussing the stalled Doha Round). Although the Doha
round did not officially fail until 2015, it was clear much earlier that it was not going to succeed; its
failure spurred a push for regional trade agreements like the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). See Shawn
Donnan, Trade Talks Lead to ‘Death of Doha and Birth of New WTO’, FIN. TIMES (Dec. 20, 2015),
https://www.ft.com/content/97e8525e-a740-11e5-9700-2b669a5aeb83 (stating that “since 2008 the view
of many outside the WTO’s Geneva headquarters ha[s] been that Doha ought to be buried”).
96
SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, WHO ARE WE? THE CHALLENGES TO AMERICA’S NATIONAL
IDENTITY 310 (2004); see also Carlos Lozada, Samuel Huntington, a Prophet for the Trump Era, WASH.
POST (July 18, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/book-party/wp/2017/07/18/samuelhuntington-a-prophet-for-the-trump-era/ (discussing how Samuel Huntington foresaw the rise of
backlash to multiculturalism).
97
Regina Branton et al., All Along the Watchtower: Acculturation Fear, Anti-Latino Affect, and
Immigration, 73 J. POL. 664, 667 (2011).
98
See id. at 667–69, 674 (describing the post-9/11 shift in national identity as an “expression of
nativist tendencies” characterized by a “distrust or antipathy towards outgroups” and embrace of cultural
traditionalism); Molly K. McKew, Trump Handed Putin a Stunning Victory, POLITICO MAG. (July 7,
2017),
http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/07/07/trump-handed-putin-a-stunning-victory215353 (maintaining that Trump has embraced traditionalism as the foundation of national identity,
emphasizing the protection of U.S. “traditional[] values” and culture).
99
See Gregg Henriques, Trump: An Antiestablishment Hero?, in WHY IRRATIONAL POLITICS
APPEALS: UNDERSTANDING THE ALLURE OF TRUMP 107, 112 (Mari Fitzduff ed., 2017) (discussing how
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nationalists, in turn, perceive non-native people as a threat, and they
maintain that minorities must assimilate into the dominant culture,
discarding their old customs and learning the language, customs, and values
of their new nation.100 Immigrants that maintain different value systems are
viewed as a threat to fragile liberal democracy,101 as are foreign ideologies
and ideas.102 This identity has emerged at various points in U.S. history, such
as in anti-Catholic and anti-Jewish sentiment in the 19th and 20th centuries,
as well as with the rise of the Ku Klux Klan.103
Prior to the 2016 election, the increase in protectionism appeared to be
isolated. As one commentator observed in 2012, there was no intellectual
movement away from free-market capitalism or fundamental rethinking of
the relationship between the state and the market.104 Notwithstanding the
resurgence of cultural traditionalism among various groups, support for
liberal economic policies remained strong in the government.105
the Republicans have “tried to reach out to cultural traditionalists with emphases on traditional Christian
family values”); Gregg Henriques, An Anti-Establishment Theory of Trump, PSYCHOL. TODAY (Sept. 6,
2016), https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/theory-knowledge/201609/anti-establishment-theorytrump (defining cultural traditionalists as “tak[ing] pride in their local perspectives and hometown
values”). See also, Sean Trende, Why Trump? Why Now?, REALCLEAR POLITICS (Jan. 29, 2016),
https://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2016/01/29/why_trump_why_now_129486.html (contrasting
cultural traditionalists with cultural cosmopolitanists).
100
See Uri Friedman, What is a Nativist?, ATLANTIC (Apr. 11, 2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/04/what-is-nativist-trump/521355/ (explaining
that political scientist Cas Muddle defines nativism as “an ideology that wants congruence of state and
nation—the political and the cultural unit”); Jack Citrin, The End of American Identity?, in ONE
AMERICA?: POLITICAL LEADERSHIP, NATIONAL IDENTITY, AND THE DILEMMAS OF DIVERSITY 285, 287
(Stanley A. Renshon, ed., 2001) (observing that “[t]he nativist response to a multiethnic society is to
prescribe cultural conformity”); MIRIAM FELDBLUM, RECONSTRUCTING CITIZENSHIP: THE POLITICS OF
NATIONALITY REFORM AND IMMIGRATION IN CONTEMPORARY FRANCE 53 (1999) (observing that
nativism is “a specific form of nationalism” that “regards people and ideologies of foreign origin as
sources of disloyalty and threats to national identity”).
101
See Jozef Andrew Kosc, The Liberal Roots of Nativism: Where Trump Meets Tocqueville,
FOREIGN AFF. (Sept. 29, 2017), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2017-0929/liberal-roots-nativism (arguing that Trump and other nativists wrongly believe that “immigrants with
different value systems pose a threat” to fragile liberal democracies).
102
See Friedman, supra note 100 (quoting Cas Muddle as stating that “the non-native is not only
people” but “can also be ideas”); FELDBLUM, supra note 100, at 53 (stating that “[n]ativism, as a specific
form of nationalism, regards people and ideologies of foreign origin as sources of disloyalty and threats
to the national identity”).
103
See Gerald Friedman, Nativism: As American as (Rotten) Apple Pie, DOLLARS & SENSE 13, 14–
17 (Nov./Dec. 2016) (discussing the history of nativism in the United States); Alan M. Kraut, Nativism,
FOR
MIGRATION
STUD.
(Feb.
8,
2016),
An
American
Perennial,
CTR.
http://cmsny.org/publications/kraut-nativism/ (discussing nativism towards immigrants in the United
States in the 20th and 21st centuries); LOUIS DOW SCISCO, POLITICAL NATIVISM IN NEW YORK STATE
253 (1901) (discussing nativism in 1800s New York and observing that nativists opposed “foreign ideas
as to church, state and society”).
104
See Pryke, supra note 41, at 289–90 (stating that the “shift away from free market capitalism”
that existed in the 1930s does not exist today).
105
See id. (discussing that “neoliberalism has been strengthened” over time).
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Trump’s election, however, provided the link that the anti-free trade
movement was previously missing. Trump has consistently called for
protectionist policies106 He has imposed a variety of tariffs on goods from
traditional allies, such as Canada, Mexico, and the European Union.107 He
has also started a trade war with China with rapidly escalating tariffs.108
Trump signed a “Buy American and Hire American” executive order,
claiming the order would “promote economic and national security” and
“create higher wages and employment rates for workers in the United
States.”109 He furthermore shunned free trade agreements and rejected the
TPP, which continued without the United States.110
To some degree, these protectionist policies have enjoyed bipartisan
support among voters and politicians.111 Bernie Sanders broadly supported
protectionist policies during his campaign—he called for “fair trade” instead
of “free trade” and delivered a strong message against corporate interests.112
Sanders claimed, notwithstanding strong evidence to the contrary, that the

106
See Brian Katulis, Democrats Need a Strong Alternative to Trump’s ‘Economic Nationalism,’
FOREIGN POL’Y (Mar. 17, 2017, 1:13 PM), http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/03/17/democrats-need-astrong-alternative-to-trumps-economic-nationalism/ (observing Trump’s relative consistency with
supporting protectionist policies).
107
See Press Release, The White House, What You Need to Know About Implementing Steel and
Aluminum Tariffs on Canada, Mexico, and the European Union, (May 31, 2018),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/articles/need-know-implementing-steel-aluminum-tariffs-canada-mexicoeuropean-union/.
108
See infra Part III.C.
109
Exec. Order No. 13788, 3 C.F.R. § 2(a)–(b) (2018). This policy has been criticized by both leftleaning and right-leaning groups as protectionist. See, e.g., Nicholas Clairmont, The Many Ways ‘Buy
American’
Can
Harm
the
Economy,
ATLANTIC
(Apr.
19,
2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2017/04/buy-american-trump/523584/ (discussing how
economists view Trump’s policy as harmful to consumers and providing minimal to no benefits); David
Harsanyi, Trump’s ‘Buy American, Hire American’ Policy is Dangerous Nonsense, NAT’L REV. (Apr.
21, 2017, 4:00 AM), https://www.nationalreview.com/2017/04/donald-trump-buy-americanprotectionism/ (arguing that Trump’s executive order and other actions run the risk of normalizing
protectionism).
110
See Peter Baker, Trump Abandons Trans-Pacific Partnership, Obama’s Signature Trade Deal,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 23, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/23/us/politics/tpp-trump-tradenafta.html (discussing Trump’s abandonment of the TPP); Alex Ward, The Trans-Pacific Partnership
Has Been Resurrected—and It’s Happening Without the US, VOX (Nov. 11, 2017, 3:38 PM),
https://www.vox.com/2017/11/11/16637826/trump-trans-pacific-partnership
(discussing
TPP
negotiations with the remaining countries).
111
In the fall of 2016, 85% of Republicans and 54% of Democrats believed that free trade had cost
the United States more jobs than it had brought. Benjamin Oreskes, POLITICO-Harvard Poll: Amid
Trump’s Rise, GOP Voters Turn Sharply Away from Free Trade, POLITICO (Sept. 24, 2016, 7:44 AM),
http://www.politico.com/story/2016/09/politico-harvard-poll-free-trade-trump-gop-228600.
112
Bernie Sanders & Daily News Editorial Board, TRANSCRIPT: Bernie Sanders Meets with the
Daily News Editorial Board, April 1, 2016, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Apr. 4, 2016),
http://www.nydailynews.com/opinion/transcript-bernie-sanders-meets-news-editorial-board-article1.2588306.
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globalized economy was increasing global poverty. His website states that
“[i]f corporate America wants us to buy their products they need to
manufacture those products in this country, not in China or other low-wage
countries.”114
But unlike Sanders’s anti-corporate position, Trump’s policies appear to
be grounded in the reemerging national identity of cultural traditionalism.115
As George W. Bush noted, under Trump, “[w]e’ve seen nationalism
distorted into nativism” and have “forgotten the dynamism that immigration
has always brought to America.”116 Trump has tapped into people’s worst
fears—that free trade has destroyed U.S. jobs, that immigrants are killing us,
and that the country’s best days are behind it.117 Commentator Eric Li has
observed that Trump is pushing back against a world that is moving towards
“a unified set of rules and standards in economics, politics, international
relations, and even morality.”118 The fear is that cultural distinctions between
countries will disappear and give rise to shared values that are at odds with
those who hold power.119
Strong sovereignty is a key part of Trump’s vision for U.S. national
identity and nationalism. In addressing the United Nations, Trump
113
See Jonathan Chait, Bernie Sanders’s Case Against Free Trade is More Ignorant than Donald
MAGAZINE:
DAILY
INTELLIGENCER
(June
29,
2016),
Trump’s,
N.Y.
http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2016/06/bernies-case-against-trade-dumber-than-trumps.html
(discussing research showing that globalization helps the poor in developing countries); Bernie Sanders,
Bernie Sanders: Democrats Need to Wake Up, N.Y. TIMES (June 28, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/29/opinion/campaign-stops/bernie-sanders-democrats-need-towake-up.html (maintaining that the “increasingly globalized economy, established and maintained by the
world’s economic elite, is failing people everywhere”).
114
Income and Wealth Inequality, BERNIE SANDERS, https://berniesanders.com/issues/income-andwealth-inequality/ (last visited Nov. 21, 2018).
115
See Kosc, supra note 101 (characterizing Trump as a nativist); Shahrzad Sabet, Opinion, The
Science Behind Donald Trump’s ‘Us vs. Them’ Rhetoric, L.A. TIMES (May 23, 2016, 5:00 AM),
http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-sabet-globalization-sanders-trump-20160520-snapstory.html# (distinguishing the anti-corporate protectionism of Sanders from the “us versus them”
rhetoric of Trump).
116
Peter Baker, Without Saying ‘Trump,’ Bush and Obama Deliver Implicit Rebukes, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 19, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/19/us/politics/george-bush-trump.html.
117
See Molly Ball, Donald Trump and the Politics of Fear, ATLANTIC (Sept. 2, 2016),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/09/donald-trump-and-the-politics-of-fear/498116/
(discussing how Trump “channels the fear coursing through the electorate” and uses it to gain supporters).
In Identity Crisis, Sides et al. maintain the election “became a vehicle for a different kind of identity
politics—oriented around white Americans’ feelings of marginalization in an increasingly diverse
America.” Thomas B. Edsall, Opinion, Donald Trump’s Identity Politics, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 24, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/24/opinion/donald-trump-identity-politics.html.
118
Eric Li, China, America, and “Nationalism”, AM . AFF. (Oct. 26, 2017),
https://americanaffairsjournal.org/2017/10/china-america-nationalism/.
119
Id.; see also Paul D. Miller, Trump’s Nationalism is Arbitrary, Dangerous, Incoherent, and Silly,
FOREIGN POL’Y (Jan. 3, 2018, 3:03 PM), http://foreignpolicy.com/2018/01/03/trumps-nationalism-isarbitrary-dangerous-incoherent-and-silly/ (“Nationalists who yearn for cultural uniformity face difficult
questions today about immigrants who share none of the characteristics—language, history, culture, or
religion—that traditionally defined national identity.”).
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repeatedly referenced “strong, sovereign nations,” including the claim that
they “allow individuals to flourish in the fullness of the life intended by
God.”120 He exalted countries “that are rooted in their histories” and “home
to patriots.”121 Trump further claimed that “the nation-state remains the best
vehicle for elevating the human condition” and maintained that all countries
should put their own interests first.122 As one commentator noted, this speech
conveyed Trump’s view that people are ultimately “defined by their
membership in a national community.”123
As discussed earlier, presidents shape national identity by choosing
which groups to include or exclude in society. Trump has taken an especially
active role in articulating who he believes does and does not belong in the
United States. He has described Africa, Haiti, and El Salvador as
“shithole[s],”124 Mexicans as criminals and “rapists,”125 and attempted to
institute a Muslim ban.126 Meanwhile, Trump has advocated for more
immigration from Norway,127 thereby sending a strong message that
minority and non-Christians are to be disdained and excluded, while white
Christian immigrants will be welcome. By failing to condemn white
supremacy marches, he has also sent the signal that hate groups are now
tolerated or even welcomed in society.128
Under the Trump administration, economic nationalism has been fueled
by the idea that outsiders and foreign ideas are harming Americans, and
globalism is eroding traditional Christian values. Prior to his election, Trump
discussed visiting “crumbling cities and the struggling schools,” and
promised that “the American worker will have his or her job protected from
120
Donald J. Trump, U.S. President, Remarks by President Trump to the 72nd Session of the United
Nations General Assembly (Sept. 19, 2017, 10:04 AM), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefingsstatements/remarks-president-trump-72nd-session-united-nations-general-assembly/.
121
Id.
122
Id.
123
Miller, supra note 119.
124
Josh Dawsey, Trump Derides Protections for Immigrants from ‘Shithole’ Countries, WASH.
POST (Jan. 12, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-attacks-protections-forimmigrants-from-shithole-countries-in-oval-office-meeting/2018/01/11/bfc0725c-f711-11e7-91af31ac729add94_story.html.
125
Wash. Post Staff, Full Text: Donald Trump Announces a Presidential Bid, WASH. POST (June
16, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2015/06/16/full-text-donald-trumpannounces-a-presidential-bid/ (providing a transcript of Trump’s speech claiming that Mexican
immigrants are bringing drugs and crime into the country and that “[t]hey’re rapists”).
126
Amy Davidson Sorkin, Donald Trump’s Crowd Cheers His Muslim Exclusion Plan, NEW
YORKER (Dec. 8, 2015), https://www.newyorker.com/news/amy-davidson/donald-trumps-crowdcheers-his-muslim-exclusion-plan.
127
Dawsey, supra note 124.
128
See Mary Stuckey, Donald Trump, the Presidency, and National Identity, MCCOURTNEY INST.
DEMOCRACY BLOG (Aug. 16, 2017), democracy.psu.edu/outreach/blog/donald-trump-the-presidencyand-national-identity-mary-stuckey (discussing how Trump’s silence after the white supremacy march
in Charlottesville “ceded the interpretive space,” thereby creating “an opportunity for others to take that
space”).
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129

unfair foreign competition.” He has characterized foreign countries as
“cheaters,” claiming that they “subsidize their goods, devalue their
currencies, violate their agreements and cheat in every way imaginable.”130
Trump proclaimed that “[w]e are not going to let the United States be taken
advantage of anymore.”131 As Part II discusses, this nationalist perspective
has major implications for U.S. patent policy.
II. THE EMERGENCE OF INNOVATION NATIONALISM
Although scholars have highlighted the importance of innovation since
World War II, the patent system has not always been structured to promote
it. Patents were rewards for inventors that promoted the prompt disclosure
of new inventions to the public. But over time, the purpose of the U.S. patent
system shifted, with patent rights being used to promote a governmentcultivated identity of technological innovativeness.
A. The Rise of Innovation in the U.S. Patent System
At first glance, the promotion of innovation appears to be integrated into
the U.S. intellectual property system. The Constitution grants Congress
authority “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.”132 Given
this language, one could easily believe that the historical driving force
behind patent law was promoting innovation.
Yet, the modern patent system was not designed with innovation in
mind. When Congress passed the 1952 Patent Act, it did not consider
tailoring patent law to promote the creation or dissemination of new,
beneficial technologies.133 Pasquale Federico observed that the objectives of
the statute were merely to revise and amend patent law, as well as to codify
common law practice so that patent law would be “easier to follow and
understand.”134
129
Ryan Teague Beckwith, Read Donald Trump’s Subdued Victor Speech After Winning New
Jersey, TIME (June 28, 2016), http://time.com/4360872/donald-trump-new-jersey-victory-speechtranscript/.
130
Time Staff, Read Donald Trump’s Speech on Trade, TIME (June 28, 2016),
http://time.com/4386335/donald-trump-trade-speech-transcript/ (stating that the United States “allowed
foreign countries to subsidize their goods, devalue their currencies, violate their agreements and cheat
in every way imaginable” and that he “will stand up to trade cheating”). Trump further emphasized:
“Cheating. Cheaters, that’s what they are. Cheaters.” Id.
131
Kevin Liptak & Dan Merica, Trump Delivers ‘America First’ Speech at Asia-Pacific
Economic Summit, CNN (Nov. 10, 2017, 9:13 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/11/10/politics/donaldtrump-apec-vietnam-trade/index.html.
132
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
133
See generally H.R. REP. NO. 82-1923, at 4 (1952); see generally S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 3
(1952) .
134
P.J. Federico, Commentary on the New Patent Act, 75 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 161,
170 (1993).
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Courts originally paid little attention to the promotion of innovation.
Rather, IP was regarded as a reward for new inventions, and innovation was
merely a weak justification.135 For example, in Graham v. John Deere Co.,
the Supreme Court stated that Congress may not “enlarge the patent
monopoly without regard to the innovation, advancement or social benefit
gained thereby,” and it maintained that “[i]nnovation, advancement, and
things which add to the sum of useful knowledge are inherent requisites in a
patent system.”136 The goal of the patent system was to reward inventors
who disclosed new and useful inventions to the public.137
Beginning in the 1970s, innovation became a focal point for the patent
system. Around this time, presidents began to link innovation and patents.138
President Nixon emphasized the importance of technological innovation on
the economy and discussed how patents can help facilitate this.139 In 1978,
President Carter announced an Advisory Committee to study industrial
innovation, noting that “[i]nnovation provides a basis for the Nation’s
economic growth” and “is closely related to productivity and to
competitiveness of U.S. products.”140 The following year, he proposed
upgrading and modernizing the patent system and expanding the U.S. Patent
and Trademark Office’s (PTO’s) authority to reexamine patents.141 Carter
sought to increase research and development funding and to foster
innovation from small firms.142
For the judicial branch, a similar shift began in the mid-1980s. As law
professor Gaia Bernstein observed, lower courts began discussing the role
of innovation in the United States, including how it promotes public
welfare. 143 The Supreme Court later highlighted the importance of tailoring
patent law to stimulate innovation without unduly impeding new invention.
For example, in Halo Electronics, Inc. v. Pulse Electronics, Inc., the Court
135

Gaia Bernstein, In the Shadow of Innovation, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 2257, 2282 (2010).
Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966).
137
See Bernstein, supra note 135, at 2278–79 (discussing the goals of the patent system to reward
innovation and promote utilitarian objectives).
138
Prior to the 1970s, there had been some weaker presidential statements regarding the
importance of innovation. For example, in liberalizing trade, President Kennedy noted the importance
of maintaining technological leadership “through industrial research and development innovation.”
John F. Kennedy, U.S. President, Annual Budget Message to the Congress, Fiscal Year 1964 (Jan. 17,
1963) (transcript available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=9241).
139
Richard Nixon, U.S. President, Special Message to the Congress on Science and Technology
(Mar. 16, 1972) (transcript available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=3773).
140
Jimmy Carter, U.S. President, Industrial Innovation Announcement of Establishment of an
Interagency Committee (May 11, 1978) (transcript available at
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=30779).
141
Jimmy Carter, U.S. President, Industrial Innovation Initiatives Message to the Congress on
Administration Actions and Proposals (Oct. 31, 1979) (transcript available at
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=31628).
142
Id.
143
Bernstein, supra note 142, at 2284–85.
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observed that patent law must balance promoting innovation through patent
protection with facilitating the imitation “necessary to invention itself and
the very lifeblood of a competitive economy.” 144
With regard to legislation, a shift began in the 1980s. The Bayh-Dole
Act was the result of Carter’s call for increasing productivity through
industrial innovation145 and was designed to provide incentives for
commercialization of government-funded inventions.146 In the Patent Law
Amendments Act of 1984, Congress created a National Commission of
Innovation and Productivity147 with the goal of fostering technological
change and stimulating innovation among privately employed individuals.148
By the time the 2011 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA) was passed,
promoting innovation had become an explicit and key goal of Congress.149
The House Judiciary Committee acknowledged the importance of “our
national culture of innovation,” and it expressed the need to “nurture U.S.
innovation” by helping small business entities.150 The AIA’s passage was
designed, in part, to revise poor PTO procedure, which some believed
threatened the country’s “competitive edge in the global economy.”151
144
Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1935 (2016) (quoting Bonito Boats, Inc.
v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989)) (quotation marks omitted); see also Commil
USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1920, 1930 (2015) (discussing how non-practicing entities or
patent trolls obtain a “harmful tax on innovation” by extracting licensing fees through demand letters)
(quoting L. Greisman, Federal Trade Commission on A Bill to Enhance Federal and State Enforcement
of Fraudulent Patent Demand Letters: Hearing on H.R. __ Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Mfg.,
& Trade of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 113th Cong. 2 (2014) (statement of Lois Greisman,
Associate Director, Bureau of Consumer Protection, Federal Trade Commission) (quotation marks
omitted); Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 71 (2012) (observing that
monopolization of basic phenomena of nature through a patent may “impede innovation more than it
would tend to promote it”); Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 609 (2010) (observing that the
patentability limitations in the Patent Act adjust the tension “between stimulating innovation by
protecting inventors and impeding progress by granting patents when not justified by the statutory
design”).
145
H.R. REP. NO. 96-1307, pt. 1, at 2 (1980).
146
Bayh-Dole Act, Pub. L. No. 96-517, § 6(a), 94 Stat. 3018 (1980) (codified as amended at 35
U.S.C. § 200 (2012)) (“It is the policy and objective of the Congress to use the patent system to promote
the utilization of inventions arising from federally supported research or development . . . to promote the
commercialization.”).
147
Patent Law Amendments Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-622, 98 Stat. 3383, 3389, §§ 301–03.
The Commission was to be comprised of members of Congress and the Executive branch. Id. at § 302.
148
Patent Law Amendments Act of 1984 § 303 (“The Commission shall make recommendations
for such revisions of the laws . . . and such other changes as the Commission considers will better foster
innovation and productivity.”); see Presidential Statement on Signing H.R. 6286 Into Law, 20 WEEKLY
COMP. PRES. DOC. 1818-19 (Nov. 9, 1984) (including a statement from President Reagan that the
creation of the National Commission of Innovation and Productivity creates duplicative work, is poorly
structured, and that the private sector is better equipped to determine “methods to stimulate increased
productivity”).
149
H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, pt. 1, at 40 (2011).
150
Id. at 50, 56.
151
See id. at 40 (“If the United States is to maintain its competitive edge in the global economy, it
needs a system that will support and reward all innovators with high quality patents.”); 153 CONG. REC.
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B. Innovativeness as a Component of U.S. National Identity
These changes in how the government views innovation shows the
gradual formation of a new component of U.S. national identity—
technological innovativeness. Politicians do not seek innovation merely for
the sake of promoting economic growth; they want to be the best innovators.
President Obama argued that “[t]he first step in winning the future is
encouraging American innovation” and said that we needed to “outinnovate” other countries.152 The late Senator John McCain agreed, and
emphasized that the United States had “the ability to out-compete anyone in
the world and out-innovate.”153 The media further helped promote the belief
that it is important to be the most innovative country in the world.154 The
United States’ innovative identity is recognized abroad and has been studied
with the goal of emulating it in the European Union.155
Several scholars have linked technological innovation with nationalism.
Historian David Edgerton described “techno-nationalism,” in which various
countries have promoted “the inventive citizen” as a part of modern
nationalism by exaggerating the importance of their nationals’ inventions.156
He further observed the adaptation of national identities in various countries
to accommodate technological advancement, by using nationalistic beliefs
to spur research and development funding.157 Communications scholar
23941 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 2007) (statement of Rep. Eshoo) (“The rapid pace of innovation and
increasingly complex patent filings have strained the Patent and Trademark Office and patent claims of
questionable validity have been granted.”).
152
Barack Obama, U.S. President, Remarks by the President in State of the Union Address (Jan.
25, 2011) (transcript available at https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-pressoffice/2011/01/25/remarks-president-state-union-address).
153
Scott Wong, McCain Agrees with Obama on Innovation, Trade, POLITICO: POLITICO NOW
BLOG (Mar. 6, 2011, 10:48 AM EST), http://www.politico.com/blogs/politico-now/2011/03/mccainagrees-with-obama-on-innovation-trade-033981 (quoting Senator John McCain).
154
See, e.g., Frederick Hess, America is Still the Most Innovative Country in the World,
ATLANTIC (Nov. 14, 2011), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2011/11/america-is-still-themost-innovative-country-in-the-world/248430/ (arguing the United States should utilize its unique
strengths such as federalism and entrepreneurship to support growth and prosperity).
155
See BENGT-ÅKE LUNDVALL, INNOVATION, GROWTH AND SOCIAL COHESION: THE DANISH
MODEL 3 (2002) (discussing how Denmark has strived to take the positive aspects of U.S. innovation
and adapt them to promote social cohesion); Marcel Salathé, Creating a European Culture of
Innovation, MARCEL SALATHÉ’S BLOG (Oct. 30, 2015, 1:00 PM), http://blog.salathe.com/creating-aeuropean-culture-of-innovation (discussing the U.S. culture for entrepreneurship and innovation and
how Europe can emulate it).
156
David E. H. Edgerton, The Contradictions of Techno-Nationalism and Techno-Globalism: A
Historical Perspective, 1 NEW GLOBAL STUD. 1, 2 (2007); see also G. Pascal Zachary, Creativity,
Innovation and the Cultural Parade, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 15, 2007),
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/15/business/yourmoney/15ping.html (discussing the different
technological strengths of different countries).
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Edgerton, supra note 156, at 5. Edgerton has argued that although research and development is
correlated with economic growth, the same cannot be said on a national scale, given other countries
benefit from the innovations of a single country. Id.
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Marco Andria has argued that technology plays an important role in shaping
how citizens develop regional and national allegiance, particularly
technology relating to communication.158
U.S. innovation identity further ties into economic nationalism.
Although promoting technological innovation is not protectionist,
government officials promote it to advance economic growth, regarding it
as “the key driver to our economy.”159 Dr. Patrick Gallagher—the former
Under Secretary of Commerce for Standards and Technology—described
promoting technological innovation as the “centerpiece” of Obama’s
economic agenda.160 As Chairman of the U.S. Federal Reserve Board, Ben
Bernanke maintained that “innovation and technological change are
undoubtedly central to the growth process” and discussed the importance of
the government funding research and development to promote innovation.161
The government’s commitment to promoting innovation sometimes
borders on propaganda. For example, law professor Mark Lemley reported
receiving an e-mail from an unnamed State Department official regarding a
social media project between the State Department’s Bureau of Economic
Affairs and the Office of Intellectual Property Enforcement.162 Set for the
week after Independence Day “when everyone gets back from vacation but
will still feel patriotic and summery,” the official encouraged Lemley and
others to tie Independence Day to innovation, with statements such as “Bet
you couldn’t see the Independence Day fireworks without bifocals; first
American diplomat Ben Franklin invented them #bestIPmoment
@StateDept.”163 The e-mail claimed that pro-IP groups including the Motion
Picture Association of America and the Recording Industry of America
agreed to participate.164
Like with other forms of nationalism, there has been an undercurrent of
victimization with innovation and patent rights. This can be seen most
158

MARCO ANDRIA, TECHNOLOGY AND NATIONALISM 9 (2010).
Dr. Patrick Gallagher, Director, NIST, Innovation as a Key Driver of Economic Growth &
Competitiveness (June 20, 2012), https://www.nist.gov/speech-testimony/innovation-key-drivereconomic-growth-competitiveness; see also NAT’L ECON. COUNCIL & OFFICE OF SCI. & TECH. POLICY,
A STRATEGY FOR AMERICAN INNOVATION 2 (2015) (describing technological innovation as “a
wellspring of economic growth”).
160
Id.
161
Ben S. Bernanke, Promoting Research and Development: The Government’s Role, 27 ISSUES
SCI. & TECH. (Summer 2011), http://issues.org/27-4/bernanke.
162
Mark
Lemley,
FACEBOOK
(July
4.,
2017)
https://www.facebook.com/mark.lemley/posts/10154597449065846. See also Jacob Brogan, State
Department Tries to Start “Fake Twitter Feud,” Understands Neither Feuds nor Twitter, SLATE (Jul. 7,
2017,
11:33
AM),
http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2017/07/07/the_state_department_tried_to_start_a_fake_twitt
er_feud_over_intellectual.html (remarking on the “profound strangeness” of the request Professor Mark
Lemley was given to start a “‘fake Twitter [f]eud’”).
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Brogan, supra note 162.
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Lemley, supra note 162.
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clearly with trade-related provisions pertaining to IP rights. As discussed
above, under the Trade Act of 1974, the ITC was granted final authority to
exclude imported products resulting from unfair trade.165 Although the
statute was not intended to address IP infringement, patent attorneys
discovered that it could be used to exclude infringing goods.166 Interest
groups lobbied Congress, maintaining that action was needed to combat
international IP piracy.167 Using this victimization narrative, patent attorneys
successfully lobbied to have patent-specific language added to § 337 of the
Tariff Act, making it easier for patent holders to block infringing goods from
entering the United States.168 This put foreign litigants, as well as U.S.
companies using imported components, at a disadvantage.169
The Trade Act of 1974 also introduced § 301, which authorizes the
President to retaliate if “an act, policy, or practice of a foreign country”
either “violates, or is inconsistent with, the provisions of, or otherwise denies
benefits to the United States under, any trade agreement” or if it “is
unjustifiable and burdens or restricts United States commerce.”170 Such
investigations may be initiated by a private party or by the U.S. Trade
Representative (USTR).171 As discussed in Part III.C, this provision has been
embraced by the Trump administration to protect IP rights.172
III. ADVANCING ECONOMIC NATIONALISM THROUGH PATENTS
The United States advances economic nationalism through its patent
policies. Under the TRIPS agreement, countries may not give preferential
treatment to their own nationals in their respective countries’ laws.173 But
even neutrally applied domestic patent laws can advance an economically
165

19 U.S.C. § 1337
Kumar, supra note 76, at 543, 546 (discussing the absence of discussion of IP issues during the
passage of the Trade Act of 1974 and the subsequent use of Section 337 to block infringing goods).
167
See Comparing Major Trade Bills: Hearings on S. 490, S. 636, and H.R. 3 Before the S. Comm.
on Fin., 100th Cong. 159 (1987) (statement of William T. Archey, Vice President, U.S. Chamber of
Commerce) (noting that intellectual property piracy costs companies in the United States between $8 and
$20 billion a year); id. at 213–14 (statement of the Office of the Chemical Industry Trade Advisor)
(discussing the problem of foreign piracy to U.S. intellectual property holders).
168
Kumar, supra note 76, at 549.
169
See id. (explaining that the 1988 Trade Act makes litigation easier and cheaper against
companies who receive imported goods).
170
19 U.S.C. § 2411(a)(1)(B)(i)–(ii) (2016). See also Patricia I. Hansen, Note, Defining
Unreasonableness in International Trade: Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, 96 YALE L.J. 1122,
1122–24 (1987) (providing a detailed overview of § 301).
171
19 U.S.C. § 2412(a)(1), (b) (2012).
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See infra Part III.C.
173
See CAROLYN DEERE, THE IMPLEMENTATION GAME: THE TRIPS A GREEMENT AND THE
GLOBAL POLITICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REFORM IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 65 (2008)
(observing that a “core principle of TRIPS” is the requirement for WTO members to adopt the GATT
principles of national treatment and “most-favored nation” treatment, thereby limiting members from
discriminating against foreign inventors or favoring their nationals in IP protection).
166
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nationalistic agenda by increasing protection in ways that benefit the United
States’s own industries.174 Similarly, trade agreements can be used to get
stronger protection for patents in developing countries, which
disproportionately benefits the United States.
A. Domestic Substantive Patent Rights
Innovation plays a major role in the economy, but it is less certain what
role patents play.175 Legal commentators generally agree that indefinitely
expanding patent and other IP rights does not promote innovation, let alone
domestic economic growth,176 and some scholars have proposed using
alternative means for financing innovation.177 As law professor Robert
Merges and economist Richard Nelson observed almost thirty years ago, a
“potential inventor is also a potential infringer” whose ability to innovate
could be harmed by another patent.178 It is also clear that some industries,
like biopharmaceuticals, benefit from broad patent rights more than
others.179
174

See Jerome H. Reichman, Intellectual Property in the Twenty-First Century: Will the Developing
Countries Lead or Follow?, 46 HOUS. L. REV. 1115, 1118–19 (2009) (discussing how the TRIPS
Agreement favored countries with “developed national systems of innovation and whose multinational
companies owned plenty of patented high-tech products to sell or manufacture around the world”
(footnote omitted)). But see William Hubbard, The Competitive Advantage of Weak Patents, 54 B.C. L.
REV. 1909, 1926–27 (2013) (arguing that even if U.S. patent law sometimes favors U.S. firms, the
advantage has lessened as the “innovative capacities” of foreign firms has expanded and transaction costs
to acquiring patents has decreased).
175
See FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE: ALIGNING PATENT NOTICE AND
REMEDIES WITH COMPETITION 8–9 (2011) (discussing how competition promotes innovation and
observing that patent assertion entities “can deter innovation by raising costs and risks without making a
technological contribution”); Gerard J. Tellis et. al., Radical Innovation Across Nations: The
Preeminence of Corporate Culture, 73 J. MARKETING 3, 15–16 (2009) (finding that for radical or
disruptive innovation in firms, internal corporate culture is the primary driver, and not patents).
176
See, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and
Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017, 1031 (1989) (observing that although technological change
promotes economic growth, “it does not necessarily follow that patent protection is necessary to preserve
adequate economic incentives for invention and innovation”); Henry C. Su, Invention is Not Innovation
and Intellectual Property is Not Just Like Any Other Form of Property: Competition Themes from the
FTC’s March 2011 Patent Report, ANTITRUST SOURCE 1, 1–2 (Aug. 2011) (maintaining that promoting
invention under the patent system does not necessarily promote innovation).
177
See Camilla A. Hrdy, Patent Nationally, Innovate Locally, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1301, 1303–
4 (2016) (discussing the growing concern among academics that IP rights hinder innovation and
observing that several academics have called for the use of direct public financing); Daniel J. Hemel &
Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Beyond the Patents-Prizes Debate, 92 TEX. L. REV. 303, 314 (2013)
(maintaining that prizes, grants, and refundable tax credits can incentivize innovation like patents, and if
structured appropriately, can reduce “deadweight loss”).
178
Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM.
L. REV. 839, 916 (1990).
179
See Julie E. Cohen & Mark Lemley, Patent Scope and Innovation in the Software Industry, 89
CAL. L. REV. 1, 18–19 (2001) (discussing problems that broad patent protection can cause to the software
industry); Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1589–90
(2003) (discussing the wide variation across industries regarding usefulness of patent rights).
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Various legislators, however, are in favor of broader patent protection
to facilitate global competitiveness and promote innovation.180 In 2018, the
bipartisan STRONGER Patents Act was reintroduced in the House, which
would make it considerably harder for third parties to challenge bad patents
and make it easier for patent holders to obtain injunctions.181 The bill
explicitly links strong patents to innovation, asserting that “the United States
needs to uphold strong patent protections to maintain its position as the
world’s premier innovative country.”182 The proposed Restoring American
Leadership in Innovation Act of 2018 seeks to go one step further. In order
“[t]o promote the leadership of the United States in global innovation,” the
bill would abolish the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, making it harder to
invalidate bad patents.183
At first glance, it might appear that such domestic patent policy and
economic nationalism are unrelated. The Patent Act applies equally to
domestic and foreign inventors, as is required by the TRIPS Agreement.
Provisions that were blatantly discriminatory to foreign inventors were
removed under the America Invents Act.184
Unduly strong patent and other IP rights, however, can create a market
distortion similar to that of protectionist tariffs. The IP system is an attempt
to correct market failures that occur when people can freely copy, thereby

180

See, e.g., 157 CONG. REC. S5411 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch)
(maintaining that strengthening the U.S. patent system “will help us maintain our competitive edge both
domestically and abroad”); 157 CONG. REC. S5422 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 2011) (statement of Rep. Harold
Rogers) (maintaining that allowing the PTO to keep its fees “will help U.S. innovators remain
competitive in today’s global economy”); 157 CONG. REC. S1089 (daily ed. Mar. 2, 2011) (statement of
Sen. Patrick Leahy) (“If America is to win the global economic competition, we need the improvements
in our patent system that [the Patent Reform Act of 2011] can bring.”).
Note that this belief is not necessarily true—strong U.S. patents also benefit foreign firms that apply
for them, and weak patents can spur innovation through facilitating domestic competition. See Lucas S.
Osborn et al., A Case for Weakening Patent Rights, 89 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1185, 1236–38 (2015)
(maintaining that global competitiveness concerns favor weakening U.S. patents).
181
See Steve Brachmann, STRONGER Patents Act Introduced in House, Seeks to Strengthen a
Crippled
Patent
System,
IP
Watchdog,
March
26,
2018,
https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/03/26/stronger-patents-act-house/id=95188/ (discussing bipartisan
legislation curtail the AIA). See also STRONGER Patents Act of 2018, H.R. 5340, 115th Cong. (2018).
182
STRONGER Patents Act of 2018, S. 1390, 115th Cong. § 101(8) (2018).
183
Restoring American Leadership in Innovation Act of 2018, H.R. 6264, 115th Cong. (2018). See
also, Stephen Key, Pro-Patent Bills are in Congress. Why That Matters, FORBES, July 24, 2018,
https://www.forbes.com/sites/stephenkey/2018/07/24/pro-patent-bills-are-in-congress-why-thatmatters/#6003644691d3 (discussing how H.R. 6264 would abolish the Patent Trial and Appeal Board).
184
Prior to the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA) in 2011, the first-to-invent system
explicitly discriminated against foreign inventors, by restricting proof of invention to activity that
occurred in the United States. See R. Carl Moy, Essay: Patent Harmonization, Protectionism, and
Legislation, 74 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 777, 783–88 (1992) (discussing how pre-AIA 35
U.S.C. § 102(a), (b), and (g) discriminated against foreign inventors by limiting foreign information that
could defeat an inventor’s patent application and created a transfer of wealth from foreign to domestic
entities).
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decreasing the incentive to innovate. IP rights prevent competition and
allow the owner to charge supra-competitive prices, with the goal of
benefiting the public through encouraging the creation and dissemination of
new works.186
Like other regulatory regimes, the IP system does not always operate for
the public welfare.187 Public choice theory suggests that Congress will pass
legislation that benefits the best-organized interest groups.188 These groups
may share ideological interests,189 which can include promoting national
identity. Nationalistic lawmakers can be misled by those that purport to
support a nationalistic agenda, but ultimately seek to benefit themselves at
the public’s expense.190
Strong IP rights can serve a quasi-protectionist purpose. Congress can
strengthen neutral IP laws in ways that benefit well-funded and wellorganized industries in which the United States dominates.191 In doing so,
government helps these groups compete globally by providing them with
additional revenue from enhanced protection.192 Such behavior is actually
anticipated under the national treatment provision of the GATT, which
authorizes the WTO to deal with disputes in which facially neutral legal

185

See Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust and the Regulatory Enterprise, 2004 C OLUM. BUS. L. REV.
335, 336 (2004) (maintaining that the “IP system is a very elaborate effort to correct [the] market failure”
of free riding).
186
See Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. L.
REV. 989, 996–97 (1997) (describing how IP rights hinder competition, thereby allowing IP owners to
charge higher prices).
187
See Hovenkamp, supra note 185, at 337 (observing that the IP system “is hardly immune from
the legislative imperfections that public choice theory uncovers”); Joel R. Paul, Do International Trade
Institutions Contribute to Economic Growth and Development?, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 285, 293–94 (2003)
(discussing how IP rights distort competition in international markets).
188
See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Politics Without Romance: Implications of Public Choice Theory
for Statutory Interpretation, 74 VA. L. REV. 275, 287 (1988) (observing that “[g]roups that are formally
organized and willing to spend money to obtain or block legislation will tend to monopolize the attention
of legislators, at the expense of groups that are not organized.”).
189
Id. at 286.
190
See Bruno S. Frey, The Public Choice View of International Political Economy, 38 INT’L ORG.
199, 210 (1984) (discussing how interest groups influence tariffs); Erich Weede, Economic Policy and
International Security: Rent-Seeking, Free Trade and Democratic Peace, 1 EUR. J. INT’L REL. 519,
527 28 (1995) (discussing how rent-seeking by interest groups undermines free trade).
191
Daniel A. Farber & Robert E. Hudec, Free Trade and the Regulatory State: A GATT’s-Eye View
of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1401, 1422 (1994) (discussing two facially neutral
ways that Congress can disadvantage foreign producers in favor of American producers); see infra Part
III.A.1.
192
Howard F. Chang, An Economic Analysis of Trade Measures to Protect the Global Environment,
83 GEO. L.J. 2131, 2188 (1995) (discussing how parties can challenge facially neutral regulations or
taxes for violations of the GATT’s national treatment provision); Farber & Hudec, supra note 191, at
1421 (discussing how neutral regulations can disproportionately impact foreign firms).
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measures disproportionately impact foreign firms. The losers are U.S.
consumers, who must pay higher prices for goods and services.194
This quasi-protectionism can be seen under the Copyright Term
Extension Act (CTEA), in which rent-seeking content owners successfully
lobbied Congress to extend the copyright of existing works.195 The CTEA
was facially neutral; it helped bring the U.S. copyright term in line with some
of its foreign counterparts and did not single out domestic applicants for
special treatment.196 But there was no discernable public benefit, leading
some to argue that the CTEA was a private appropriation of public
property.197
Although simple protectionism can be used to describe the drive toward
stronger copyright protection, nationalistic rhetoric plays a role as well. In
an open letter to Trump, signed by nineteen industry groups including
Recording Industry Association of America and American Society of
Composers, Authors, and Publishers, the music industry lobbied for

193

See Elizabeth Trujillo, Mission Possible: Reciprocal Deference Between Domestic Regulatory
Structures and the WTO, 40 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 201, 202–03 (2007) (discussing the difficulty of World
Trade Organization panels assessing facially neutral regulations that have protectionist effects).
194
See Herbert Hovenkamp, Innovation and the Domain of Competition Policy, 60 ALA. L. REV.
103, 118, 125 (2008) (discussing how the U.S. patent system puts the interests of patentees ahead of “the
much larger and more diverse population that represents users of patented products or processes” and
maintaining that the Copyright Act “reads like a recipe book for capture”).
195
See Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105 298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998)
(codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 108, 203(a)(2), 301(c), 302, 303, 304(c)(2)); Christopher
Buccafusco & Paul J. Heald, Do Bad Things Happen When Works Enter the Public Domain?: Empirical
Tests of Copyright Term Extension, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1, 7 8 (2013) (discussing the lobbying
efforts of Disney and other copyright holders and observing that eighteen of the twenty-five sponsors
for the CTEA received Disney money); Paul J. Heald & Suzanna Sherry, Implied Limits on the
Legislative Power: The Intellectual Property Clause as an Absolute Constraint on Congress, 2000 U.
ILL. L. REV. 1119, 1170 (2000) (maintaining that the “CTEA has precisely the same effects as the
Elizabethan grant of a monopoly in ale or printing” given that “[i]t guarantees an income stream” to
favorites of the legislature); Paul M. Schwartz & William M. Treanor, Eldred and Lochner: Copyright
Term Extension and Intellectual Property as Constitutional Property, 112 YALE L.J. 2331, 2338, 2343
(2003) (discussing how the CTEA was rent-seeking that the Framers of the Constitution had intended to
prevent and observing that Disney worked to contract the public domain while exploiting fairy tales that
were in the public domain).
196
See Copyright Term Extension Act, H.R. REP. NO. 105 452, at 4 (1998) (describing the purpose
of the law and indicating that “[e]xtending copyright term to life of the author plus seventy years means
that the U.S. works will generally be protected for the same amount of time as works created by European
Union authors”).
197
See Buccafusco & Heald, supra note 195, at 37 (arguing that empirical evidence suggests that
the principle arguments for copyright term extension are unsupported); Joseph P. Liu, Copyright and
Time: A Proposal, 101 MICH. L. REV. 409, 421 (2002) (discussing the lack of compelling policy
arguments supporting term extension and the strong lobbying by the copyright industry); Hovenkamp,
supra note 194, at 126 27 (discussing how the public bore the cost of benefiting a few major content
providers under the CTEA). See also Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965, 1023
(1990) (maintaining that a robust public domain is necessary for maintaining the integrity of the copyright
system).
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increased copyright protection in trade agreements. The letter described
music “as one of America’s national treasures” and urged Trump to protect
rights for “those who . . . form the cultural identity of our great nation.”199
Such nationalistic sentiment is not unique to the music industry; for
example, George Lucas and Steven Spielberg both made similar appeals in
the 1980s as part of an unsuccessful push for moral rights for filmmakers.200
The U.S. pharmaceutical industry provides the clearest example of
domestic protectionist patent policy. The industry uses the cost of research
and development to justify extending drug protection through additional
patents or regulatory exclusivities.201 It also uses this argument to
successfully resist price controls found in other countries.202 Consequently,
U.S. consumers pay much higher prices than the rest of the world and
thereby subsidize pharmaceutical companies.203 Other countries benefit
from the drugs that get developed without paying the high costs.204
The government further provides an indirect subsidy to small
pharmaceutical start-ups under the Bayh-Dole Act—which allows
universities, non-profits, and small businesses to patent and commercialize
inventions that were developed with federal research money.205 Firms must
agree that any resulting products “will be manufactured substantially in the
United States.”206 U.S. consumers essentially pay twice for new
198
Daniel Kreps, Music Industry Urges Trump to Strengthen Intellectual Property Laws, ROLLING
STONE (Dec. 14, 2016, 5:52 PM), https://www.rollingstone.com/music/music-news/music-industryurges-trump-to-strengthen-intellectual-property-laws-118036/.
199
Id.
200
George Lucas testified before Congress that the United States was “in need of a moral anchor to
help define and protect its intellectual and cultural heritage” and Spielberg described film as “perhaps
our nation’s foremost ambassadors to the world . . . .” PETER DECHERNEY, HOLLYWOOD’S COPYRIGHT
WARS: FROM EDISON TO THE INTERNET 147 (2012).
201
Robin C. Feldman & Connie Wang, May Your Drug Price Be Ever Green, Oct. 29, 2017,
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3061567
(discussing
how
pharmaceutical
companies successfully added new patents or other exclusivities to existing drugs).
202
See Ben Hirschler, How the U.S. Pays 3 Times More for Drugs, SCI. AM.,
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/how-the-u-s-pays-3-times-more-for-drugs (last visited Sept.
9, 2018) (discussing how countries that directly or indirectly regulate drug costs have lower drug prices
compared to the United States).
203
See Elizabeth Whitman, How The US Subsidizes Cheap Drugs For Europe, INT’L BUS. TIMES
(Sept. 24, 2015, 1:52 PM), http://www.ibtimes.com/how-us-subsidizes-cheap-drugs-europe-2112662
(discussing how U.S. consumers fund global research and development for new drugs).
204
See Jeanne Whalen, Why the U.S. Pays More Than Other Countries for Drugs; Norway and
Other State-Run Health Systems Drive Hard Bargains, and are Willing to Say No to Costly Therapy,
WALL ST. J. (Dec. 2, 2015), https://www.wsj.com/articles/why-the-u-s-pays-more-than-other-countriesfor-drugs-1448939481 (discussing how U.S. consumers subsidize global pharmaceutical research by
paying higher prices for drugs).
205
Bayh-Dole Act, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015 (1980) (codified in 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–12)
(allowing universities, non-profits, and small business to patent and commercialize inventions that arise
from government-funded research).
206
35 U.S.C. § 204 (2012); see also Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Bayh-Dole Beyond
Borders,
4
J.L.
&
BIOSCIENCE
282,
287
(2017),
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inventions—through taxpayer funding for federal grants and through
purchasing the later-patented product or service.207 This may constitute an
impermissible subsidy under the TRIPS Agreement.208
Such quasi-protectionism links back to economic nationalism. In
following this system, the United States benefits by maintaining its identity
as being the global pharmaceutical innovation leader with the greatest
number of biopharmaceutical patents, peer-reviewed publications, clinical
trials, and venture capital investments.209 It enjoys economic benefits from
the pharmaceutical industry, while furthering its identity as an innovative
country.210
B. U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC)
Another way in which the United States advances economic nationalism
is through policing imported goods. Section 337 of the Tariff Act declares
unlawful the importation of “articles that infringe a valid and enforceable
United States patent.”211 The ITC possesses a broad power under § 337 of
the Tariff Act—the ability to grant “exclusion orders”—which direct
Customs to seize infringing imported goods.212 But only U.S patent holders
with a domestic industry can take advantage of this powerful remedy.213
In theory, the ITC can consider public welfare in its orders.214 Section
337 allows the ITC to not exclude an article if there would be an “effect of

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2919093 (discussing the Bayh-Dole Act’s “explicit
preference for federally funded inventions to be manufactured in the United States”).
207
See, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Collaborative Research: Conflicts on Authorship,
Ownership, and Accountability, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1161, 1194 (2000) (discussing how the public pays
twice under Bayh-Dole).
208
See Ruth L. Okediji, Legal Innovation in International Intellectual Property Relations:
Revisiting Twenty-One Years of the TRIPS Agreement, 36 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 191, 211 n.81 (2014)
(maintaining that the Bayh-Dole Act is arguably “an impermissible subsidy under the GATT rules”).
209
See PHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCH AND MANUFACTURER’S ASSOCIATION ET AL., THE U.S.
BIOPHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY: PERSPECTIVES ON FUTURE GROWTH AND THE FACTORS THAT WILL
DRIVE IT 13–14 (2014), http://phrma-docs.phrma.org/sites/default/files/pdf/2014-economic-futuresreport.pdf; Yuanjia Hu et al., Is the United States Still Dominant in the Global Pharmaceutical Innovation
Network?,
8
PLOS
ONE
1,
3
(2013),
http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0077247 (arguing empirically that the
United States can be considered “the dominant locus of drug innovation” from 2006 to 2010).
210
See Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Knowledge Goods and Nation-States, 101
MINN. L. REV. 167, 210 (2016) (discussing how countries may invest in knowledge production to receive
prestige-based awards).
211
19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(B)(i) (2012).
212
Id. § 1337(d).
213
See id. § 1337(a)(2) (stating that § 1337(a)(1)(B)(ii) is applicable to a patent holder only if a
domestic industry relating to the patented article “exists or is in the process of being established”).
214
See In re Certain Baseband Processor Chips, No. 337-TA-543, 2007 ITC LEXIS 621, at *284
(June 19, 2007) (Pearson, Chairman, & Pinkert, Comm’r, dissenting) (noting that Congress recognized
how broad exclusion orders could disrupt the economy and provided the ITC with the discretion to not
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such exclusion upon the public health and welfare.” However, the plain
interpretation of this language in § 337 is nearly toothless. The ITC
Commissioners have only denied an exclusion order on public welfare
grounds three times in its history, all in extraordinary cases.216 By contrast,
under the Supreme Court’s eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C. decision, a
plaintiff seeking an injunction under the Patent Act must meet the more
stringent equitable balancing test.217
The rationale for the ITC’s broad use of exclusion orders,
notwithstanding public harm, is a belief that a strong right to exclude helps
“spur innovation.”218 In the legislative history of the 1987 amendment to the
Tariff Act, Congress stated that the purpose of enforcing IP rights was to
benefit the public by promoting disclosure of IP to the public.219
Consequently, Congress asserted that importation of infringing articles
“indirectly harms the public interest.”220 This language, combined with
Congress abolishing a previous requirement that the plaintiff show injury,
led the ITC to conclude that exclusion orders should be granted to “protect
the intellectual property itself.”221
An argument can be made that the ITC grants exclusion orders merely
for the sake of keeping patents valuable, in order to reinforce the United
States’ identity of innovativeness. The public subsidizes patent holders with
a domestic industry by paying higher prices for goods that could be imported
more cheaply. Moreover, foreign patent holders are discriminated against
because they cannot take advantage of the ITC without first developing a
U.S.-based industry.
C. Foreign Patent Systems & International Trade
Patent policy advances economic nationalism when the United States is
successful in getting other countries to adopt strong patent protection.
During Maureen Ohlhausen’s tenure as the Federal Trade Commission
impose a broad exclusion order if it would not serve the public interest), rev’d in part sub nom. Kyocera
Wireless Corp. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 545 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
215
19 U.S.C. § 1337(d)(1) (2012).
216
See Spansion, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 629 F.3d 1331, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (observing that
the Commissioners of the ITC have “found public interest considerations to outweigh the need for
injunctive relief in protecting intellectual property rights” on only three occasions). Note that all three of
these cases were prior to the 1988 amendment that removed the requirement that a patentee show
irreparable harm. Id.
217
eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006) (holding that the four-part
equitable balancing test applies for injunctions issued under the Patent Act).
218
In re Certain Baseband Processor Chips, 2007 ITC LEXIS 621, at *103.
219
S. REP. NO. 100-71, at 128 (1987).
220
Id. at 128–29.
221
In re Certain Baseband Processor Chips, 2007 ITC LEXIS 621, at *106; see also In re Certain
Mobile Devices, No. 337-TA-744, 2012 ITC LEXIS 2177, at *57 (June 5, 2012) (maintaining “the public
interest favors the protection of U.S. intellectual property rights”).
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acting chairman, she observed that what the United States does in patent law
“reverberates around the world.”222 But this effect does not arise from the
United States leading by example; it comes from the United States forcing
other countries to adopt U.S.-style patent rights under threat of sanctions and
tariffs.
1. 1980 to 1995
In the mid-1980s, President Reagan began aggressively using the Trade
Act to punish countries that failed to respect U.S. IP rights and released a
“Trade Policy Action Plan” that included IP protection.223 South Korea
lacked patent rights for pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical products,
and it lacked strong copyright and trademark protection.224 This led to the
USTR initiating a § 301 action against South Korea for inadequately
protecting IP, which resulted in a 1986 agreement in which South Korea
agreed to amend its patent and other IP laws.225 Reagan further imposed
$200 million in trade sanctions against Brazil for failing to respect
pharmaceutical patents.226 This came less than a year after the United States
increased tariffs on Brazilian exports and prohibited the importation of its
computer products.227 In 1988, Congress amended the Trade Act to require
the U.S. Trade Representative to identify countries that are inadequately
protecting IP rights.228
The United States’ use of § 301 was met with broad criticism in the
foreign community. In 1989, during a meeting regarding developments in
the trading system under the GATT, the representative of Japan accused the
United States of flouting the GATT rules and acting as “judge, jury, and
executioner.”229 The European Community representative described § 301
as a “commercial nuclear bomb” and stated that the Community would not
“stand by helplessly” while the United States moved “inexorably towards

222
Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Patent Rights in a Climate of Intellectual Property Rights Skepticism,
30 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 103, 106 (2016) (arguing that developing countries considering how to protect
technology look to the United States for guidance).
223
U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, THE PRESIDENT’S TRADE POLICY ACTION PLAN 2 (Sept. 23, 1985); see
also Judith H. Bello & Alan F. Holmer, Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974: Requirements, Procedures,
and Developments, 7 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 633, 634, 653–662 (1986) (discussing the increase in § 301
proceedings beginning in 1985).
224
See Memorandum on the South Korean-United States Copyright, Patent, and Trademark Rights
Agreement, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1104 (Aug. 14, 1986) (discussing South Korea’s IP system).
225
Id. at 1104-05.
226
Statement by the Assistant to the President for Press Relations on United States Trade Sanctions
Against Brazil, 24 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 947 (July 22, 1988).
227
Statement on Trade Sanctions Against Brazil, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1326 (Nov. 13, 1987).
228
See 19 U.S.C. § 2242 (1988) (“United States Trade Representative . . . shall identify those foreign
countries that deny adequate and effective protection of intellectual property rights . . . .”).
229
GATT Secretariat, Minutes of Meeting for Review of Developments in the Trading System,
GATT Doc. C/M/233, at 8 (Aug. 31, 1989).
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committing an irreparable act of folly and unleash the apocalypse.”230
Various other representatives observed the tension between the United
States’ commitment to bilateral dispute resolution agreements and its
unilateral approach under § 301.231
Concerns regarding the lack of IP enforcement by some countries led to
changes in trade agreements and institutions. Although the World
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) was supposed “to promote the
protection of intellectual property throughout the world,”232 the United
States was concerned by attempts from developing countries to weaken
patent rules under the Paris Convention.233 The United States and others
maintained that WIPO lacked the necessary authority to sanction noncompliant countries and pushed for IP protection through multilateral
agreements.234 This led to the creation of the WTO in 1995 and paved the
way for the inclusion of IP in future trade agreements.235
2. 1995 to 2016
The shift to the WTO and linkage of IP protection to trade benefitted the
United States. Developing nations that agreed to adopt strong IP protection
secured access to market various goods.236 Countries that fought against it
were subject to coercive negotiating techniques, including threats of trade
retaliation against countries that objected to U.S. policy on IP rights under
the TRIPS Agreement.237
The United States developed a reputation for being far more aggressive
than other developed countries, both for the content of U.S. agreements, as
well as the negotiation process and implementation phase.238 For example,
230

Id. at 13, 14.
See id. at 17–25 (discussing various countries’ perspectives on United States’ commitment to
bilateral dispute resolution agreements and its unilateral approach under § 301).
232
Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization, July 14, 1967, 828
U.N.T.S. 5, 9.
233
See Laurence R. Helfer, Regime Shifting: The TRIPs Agreement and New Dynamics of
International Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 29 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 20 (2004) (discussing U.S.
opposition to weakening the Paris Convention).
234
See id. at 21 (discussing the U.S. shift to a multilateral approach for IP protection); see also
Laurinda L. Hicks & James R. Holbein, Convergence of National Intellectual Property Norms in
International Trading Agreements, 12 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 769, 782 (1997) (observing that WIPO
was perceived as lacking adequate disciplinary provisions for non-complying countries).
235
See Helfer, supra note 233, at 21 (discussing how the United States pushed for the inclusion of
IP during the Uruguay Round of GATT, which led to the creation of the WTO).
236
Id. at 22.
237
See Sarah R. Wasserman Rajec, Evaluating Flexibility in International Patent Law, 65
HASTINGS L.J. 153, 167 (2013) (discussing “coercive negotiating techniques” the United States used to
gain consensus from developing countries on IP protection).
238
See Anke Moerland, Do Developing Countries Have a Say? Bilateral and Regional Intellectual
Property Negotiations with the EU, 48 INT’L REV. OF INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 760, 762 (2017)
(comparing the United States’ approach with that of Europe and Japan).
231
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during the height of the AIDS epidemic, South Africa passed a statute
permitting the compulsory licensing of drug patents and parallel
importing.239 The Pharmaceutical Manufacturers’ Association of South
Africa led forty-one pharmaceutical companies in challenging the law,
claiming that South Africa was violating the TRIPS Agreement.240 The
plaintiffs included U.S.-based companies Bristol-Myers Squibb, Merck, and
Eli Lilly.241
The Clinton administration launched what the State Department
described as an “assiduous, concerted campaign” to overturn the law.242 This
included placing South Africa on a Special 301 Watch List of countries that
might be violating U.S. IP rights, withholding preferential tariff treatment to
South African imports, and aggressively lobbying its government.243 Critics
responded that South Africa’s law was permitted under Article 31(b) of the
TRIPS Agreement, which allowed for the compulsory licensing of drugs
during national emergencies.244 The companies in the lawsuit eventually
dropped suit and agreed to pay South Africa’s legal fees.245
The Obama administration also used the Special 301 list to call out
countries that it viewed as not adequately protecting pharmaceuticals.246
U.S. companies sought to use the USTR office to pressure India to provide
stronger pharmaceutical patent protection.247 Obama ultimately initiated a
special review of India’s IP laws with the implicit threat of sanctions for its
weak system of patent rights.248 AIDS activist groups maintained that the
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U.S. government was using the list to coerce countries into giving up rights
provided by the TRIPS Agreement.249
The Obama administration pushed for the United States to join the
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which was criticized on several fronts,
including that it provided various boons to the U.S. pharmaceutical
industry.250 The TPP required signatories to expand the period of data
exclusivity for biologic drugs.251 Although the United States’ initial demand
for a twelve-year period was later reduced, some expressed skepticism that
increased protection would promote innovation.252 The TPP was further
criticized for utilizing “patent evergreening,” requiring governments to grant
pharmaceutical companies additional patents for changes to existing
medications, even if the changes were no more beneficial than the original
drug.253
The force that the United States exerts to strengthen foreign patent
protection is illustrated by the final version of the TPP. After Trump
withdrew the United States, eleven countries entered into the TPP11.254
Although much of the agreement remained unchanged, eighteen pages were
suspended or removed from the IP section.255 The TPP11 lacks patent term
extensions if parties experience delays in obtaining a patent.256 Also missing
are special concessions related to pharmaceutical patents, including all of
the biologics and patent test data provisions.257 The TPP11 no longer
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contains new methods for protecting technology and information, and it
allows countries to retain shorter copyright terms of life plus fifty years.258
It is important to note that the “upward” harmonization of IP rights has
been rightfully criticized by several scholars, who argue that developing
countries are harmed by increased rents and loss of access to knowledge.259
This is especially true for low-to-middle-income developing countries and
their firms. Such countries do not necessarily benefit from increased patent
protection, given that they lack the resources for developing new
technologies and obtaining patents.260 The combination of strong IP rights
and forced foreign access through the TRIPS Agreement’s national
treatment provision has led to a transfer of ownership from developing
countries to the developed world.261
Multi-lateral trade agreements likely have a mixed effect on innovation.
Although developing countries benefit from trade agreements by gaining
access to U.S. markets, these benefits come at the cost of being saddled with
patent protection that provides little immediate benefit and at least shortterm harm. Indeed, when countries like the United States were developing,
their inventors did not have to negotiate a minefield of foreign patent claims
and were able to build up their technological capacity through innovation.262
But from a nationalistic perspective, trade agreements bring major benefits
for large, well-connected U.S. industries and allow the United States to
promote itself as an innovative country.
D. Changes Under the Trump Administration
The Trump administration represents a significant change in how the
United States approaches patent policy. Prior presidents promoted
innovation identity by strengthening domestic patent rights and extracting
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strong patent protection from foreign countries through trade agreements.263
Innovation identity, however has come into conflict with Trump’s nativist
and culturally traditionalist strain of nationalism.
With regard to the push towards strong patent rights, there has been no
substantial change under the Trump administration. Any decision to expand
the scope of patents would be driven by Congress, and such an effort would
fit with Trump’s views of strong sovereignty. Expanding the ITC’s powers
under the Tariff Act would likewise support Trump’s “America First”
nationalistic philosophy.
The largest change has occurred in foreign trade policy. As discussed
above, prior presidents recognized that trade agreements can be used to get
other countries to expand patent protection.264 Although the concessions that
the United States provided in exchange for increased patent protection
harmed workers in some domestic industries, patent rights holders benefitted
immensely, as did the country as a whole.265
Trump, by contrast, has expressed great disdain for trade agreements,
maintaining that they enrich foreign elites and victimize U.S. workers.266 He
described NAFTA as “the worst trade deal maybe ever signed anywhere, but
certainly ever signed in this country” and a “total disaster.”267 During his
campaign, Trump criticized the TPP as a “potential disaster” for the United
States, claiming that it hurt U.S. manufacturing.268 Upon abandoning it as
president, Trump proclaimed this to be a “[g]reat thing for the American
worker.”269 Such a position is fully consistent with the new national identity
of foreigners as posing a threat to traditional values.
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In taking this position, Trump has turned away from innovation
nationalism. By walking away from the TPP, Trump threw away major IP
benefits for various industries including longer patent terms for drugs,
additional protections for biologic medicines, and longer copyright
protection. Furthermore, Trump diminished U.S. credibility in the Pacific
Rim and helped strengthen China by limiting U.S. influence.270
Trump’s turn from innovation nationalism can also be seen with the
trade dispute with China. Although China has made considerable progress
in combatting infringement, Chinese firms continues to infringe U.S. IP
rights.271 Under Article 23.1 of the WTO’s Dispute Settlement
Understanding (DSU), WTO members are obligated to redress WTO
violations “only by recourse to the rules and procedures of the DSU, and not
through unilateral action.”272 As a WTO panel observed, “unilateral actions
threaten the stability and predictability of the multilateral trade system,” and
are “contrary to the essence of the multilateral trade system of the WTO.”273
The United States is bound by Article 23.1 under the Uruguay Round
Agreement, which was adopted by Congress to implement the WTO
Agreements.274
Instead of filing a WTO complaint and awaiting a ruling, Trump started
a trade war. He had the USTR initiate an investigation under the antiquated
§ 301 of the Trade Act, which concluded that China had committed several
IP-related offenses.275 On June 20, 2018, the USTR imposed $34 billion
270
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worth of tariffs on China, which in turn retaliated with an equal amount of
tariffs on U.S. goods.276 Since that time, the United States has escalated with
additional tariffs that China promptly matched.277 China has also filed two
complaints with the WTO over the tariffs, challenging the plan for $200
billion worth of tariffs.278
The aggressive tactics of the United States relate to nationalism and
national identity. Trump’s remarks regarding China were filled with nativist
rhetoric, linking the protection of patents and other IP to “our security and
our prosperity.”279 He stated: “We will uphold our values, we will defend
our workers, and we will protect the innovations, creations, and inventions
that power our magnificent country.”280 Through this trade war, Trump has
reinforced the victimization narrative of foreigners trying to harm
Americans, maintaining that it is his “duty and responsibility” to protect the
public “from unfair and abusive actions,” and promising to “protect
forgotten Americans who have been left behind by a global trade system.”281
Consequently, Trump has prioritized supporting an identity in which the
United States is portrayed as an island of strength that does not need to
cooperate with any foreign powers, including its allies, notwithstanding the
harm to innovation and the U.S. economy.
CONCLUSION
Patents and economic nationalism go hand-in-hand. Whether a country
views itself as cosmopolitan and innovative or nativist and culturally
traditionalist, patent policy can be used to implement a nationalistic agenda.
For many years, U.S. government officials helped cultivate innovation
nationalism as part of the country’s national identity and implemented
policies that reinforced it. Domestic patent rights were expanded through the
Patent Act to benefit key industries, with the general public paying the cost.
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U.S.-based industries were favored by being able to use the ITC to obtain
exclusion orders against infringing imports. U.S.-style patent protection was
then pushed onto others through trade agreements and threats of sanctions,
despite the lack of benefit for developing countries. Although many of these
acts were not overtly protectionist, they were nevertheless examples of
economic nationalism, with economic policies being used to promote an
innovative identity.
But under the Trump administration, innovation nationalism has come
into conflict with nativism and cultural traditionalism. Trump has eschewed
cooperation with other countries, even though trade agreements frequently
benefit patent rights holders. Instead, his “America First” policies have
relied on unilateral mechanisms, such as tariffs and trade wars. In adopting
these policies, Trump has attempted to promote the United States as a strong,
sovereign nation that will swiftly retaliate against its enemies, regardless of
the cost to innovation and harm to the U.S. economy.
Looking at patent and IP policy from a nationalistic lens highlights a
problem for those attempting to argue against misguided policies:
nationalism is often not rational. Economists have struggled since the 1930s
to convince the government that protectionist trade policies are detrimental
to the economy. Likewise, IP scholars have failed on numerous occasions to
prevent the government from senselessly expanding patent and copyright
law for the benefit of a few interest groups. To overcome this, scholars may
need to speak the same nationalistic language that the government
understands.

